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FROM DODGE TO EBAY: THE ELUSIVE
CORPORATE PURPOSE
Dalia T. Mitchell†
ABSTRACT
This article examines the history of the law of corporate purpose. I argue
that the seemingly conflicting visions of corporate social responsibility
and shareholder wealth maximization, which characterize contemporary
debates about the subject, are grounded in two different paradigms for
corporate law—a socio-political paradigm and an economic-financial
one. Advocates of the socio-political paradigm have historically focused
on the power that corporations could exercise in society, while those
embracing the economic-financial paradigm expressed concerns about the
power that the control group could exercise over the corporation’s
shareholders. Over the course of the twentieth century, scholars have
debated the merits of each of these paradigms and the concerns associated
with them, while judges drew upon the academic and, more importantly,
the managerial sentiments and concerns of the era to attach a purpose to
corporate law’s doctrine, that is, the ultra vires doctrine in the early
twentieth century, the enabling business judgment rule by midcentury,
and the laws applicable to evaluating managerial responses to hostile
takeovers at the century’s end. Ultimately, the cases seemingly
addressing corporate purpose did not endorse wealth maximization or
social responsibility as objectives. Rather, they empowered corporate
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managers to set corporate goals without interference from shareholders or
the courts.
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“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and
engage in activities designed to increase its profits . . . .”
Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962)1
INTRODUCTION

I

N 2004, eBay had purchased 28.4% of Craigslist’s stock from Phillip
Knowlton, one of Craigslist’s three shareholders.2 Adding insult to injury,
eBay created Kijiji, a competitor site.3 Craig Newmark, Craigslist’s founder,
and Jim Buckmaster, Craigslist’s third shareholder, were concerned that eBay
would gain control of Craigslist and alter its purpose, which, as they
envisioned, was to serve the community.4 In an attempt to prevent eBay from
so doing, Craigslist’s board adopted several defensive measures including a
poison pill, which “restricted eBay from purchasing additional craigslist shares
1
2
3
4

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962).
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 6, 9–11 (Del. Ch. 2010).
See id. at 6, 17–18.
Id. at 7, 8, 32.
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and hampered eBay’s ability to freely sell the craigslist shares it owned to third
parties.”5 eBay sued, claiming that, as directors and controlling shareholders,
Craig and Jim breached their fiduciary obligations to eBay, the minority
shareholder.6 According to eBay, Craig and Jim could not pursue their
proclaimed corporate purpose at the expense of maximizing profits for their
shareholders, including eBay.7
Chancellor Chandler of the Chancery Court of Delaware acknowledged
Craigslist’s unique “community-service approach to doing business,” adding
that “perhaps the most mysterious thing about Craigslist’s continued success
is the fact that craigslist does not expend any great effort seeking to maximize
its profits or to monitor its competition or its market share.”8 But Delaware
law does not allow for unique approaches. Preventing Craigslist from using
the poison pill, Chandler wrote:
The corporate form . . . is not an appropriate vehicle for
purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other
stockholders interested in realizing a return on their
investment. . . . Directors of a for-profit Delaware
corporation cannot deploy a [policy] to defend a business
strategy that openly eschews stockholder wealth
maximization—at least not consistently with the directors’
fiduciary duties under Delaware law.9
Proponents of the shareholder primacy vision of corporate law, of the
notion that corporations are stewards of their shareholders and, more
accurately, their shareholders’ investment portfolios, were quick to celebrate
Chandler’s opinion. In contrast, those who maintain that corporations should
be socially responsible have argued that the decision was at odds with the
Delaware courts’ typical deference to the board’s business judgment.10 Lyman
5

6
7
8
9
10

Id. at 6. The other defensive tactics included:
(2) implementing a staggered board that made it impossible for eBay to
unilaterally elect a director to the craigslist board, and (3) seeking to obtain a
right of first refusal in craigslist’s favor over the craigslist shares eBay owns by
offering to issue one new share of craigslist stock in exchange for every five
shares over which any craigslist stockholder granted a right of first refusal in
craigslist’s favor.
Id.; see also id. at 21–24.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 25–27.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 34–35. On Chandler’s treatment of the two additional defensive tactics, see
discussion infra Epilogue.
For an examination of these different opinions, see, for example, David G. Yosifon, The
Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 181, 183–84 (2013).
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Johnson most forcefully wrote, “[n]o corporate statute in the United States . .
. requires a corporation to advance a particular purpose, such as profit or
share price maximization;”11 case law has rarely addressed it and clearly has
not mandated a particular purpose.12
These conflicting visions of the permissible corporate purpose are not
novel, reaching back to the early twentieth-century debates about the nature
and scope of directors’ fiduciary obligations, most memorably the early 1930s
debate between Adolf A. Berle, Jr. of Columbia Law School and E. Merrick
Dodd of Harvard Law School.13 Proponents of both visions can also find
supporting precedent in different cases throughout the past century. Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., for example, proclaimed that “[a] business corporation is
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”14 Yet,
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons held that “moderate expenditures or contributions”
by a corporation toward building a “church, school, library, and baths” for its
employees “[were] directly related to the legitimate objects of the
corporation,”15 and A. P. Smith Mfg. v. Barlow suggested that “modern
conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as well
as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which they
operate.”16 More recently, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. declared that,
when faced with a hostile takeover bid, directors could assess, among other
factors, the bid’s potential “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders
(i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
generally),”17 but, shortly thereafter, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc. concluded that when a “break-up” or “sale” of a company “was
inevitable,” “the duty of the board . . . [was] . . . the maximization of the
company’s value at a sale for the stockholders’ benefits.”18
How, if at all, can these cases (and goals) be reconciled or understood?
Rather than assessing the merits of these seemingly inconsistent visions and
11
12
13

14
15
16
17
18

Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, Corporate
Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 432 (2013).
Id.
See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931)
[hereinafter Berle, Corporate Powers]; Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are
Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932) [hereinafter Berle, For Whom Corporate
Managers Are Trustees]; E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932).
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 507 (1919).
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896).
A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154 (1953).
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
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cases, this article seeks to provide a new framework to examine the
jurisprudential debates about corporate purpose. I argue that these debates
are best described as ongoing scholarly attempts throughout the past century
to fit corporations (and corporate law) in the broader narrative of the modern
American state. Corporations have traditionally represented an anomaly to
liberal legal thinkers who envisioned the world as sharply divided between
state power and individual right holders, the ruler and the ruled. A
corporation was both—an association of individual right holders, on the one
hand, but an entity with state-like powers, on the other hand. For eighteenthcentury thinkers, the continued existence of corporations demonstrated the
failure of liberal efforts to destroy the intermediate forms associated with
medieval life. Early nineteenth-century legal doctrine eased the tension by
dividing corporations into two different groups—public corporations that
“assimilated to the role of the state,” such as municipal associations, and
private corporations that “assimilated to the role of an individual in society,”
such as business organizations.19 At the turn of the twentieth century, the
emerging large publicly held business corporation undermined not only
classical liberalism but also assumptions about self-interest and efficiency
supporting classical economics.20 The scholarly debates over corporate
purpose in the past century reflect attempts to fit this anomalous creature
(and its management) within the narrative of the modern liberal, capitalist
state.21
The twentieth-century scholarly debates over the role of corporations in
society gave rise to two paradigms for corporate law—a socio-political
paradigm and an economic-financial one. Proponents of the socio-political
paradigm have historically focused on the power that corporations could
exercise in society, including over their divergent stakeholders. In turn, those
embracing the economic-financial paradigm expressed concerns about the
power that the control group (including but not limited to management)
could exercise over the corporation’s shareholders, typically viewed as
owners.
19
20
21

Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1099 (1980).
See, e.g., KAREN HO, LIQUIDATED: AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF WALL STREET 189 (2009).
See, e.g., ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 1 (1933):
The corporation has, in fact, become both a method of property tenure and a
means of organizing economic life. Grown to tremendous proportions, there
may be said to have evolved a “corporate system”—as there was once a feudal
system—which has attracted to itself a combination of attributes and powers,
and has attained a degree of prominence entitling it to be dealt with as a major
social institution.
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As this article explores, over the course of the twentieth century, as
scholars debated the merits of each of these paradigms and the concerns
associated with them, judges used both paradigms to develop the law of
corporate purpose. It rested on the twin assumptions that the modern
American state faced internal and external threats and that corporations were
best situated to help defend against such threats. Shareholders and other
stakeholders’ interests were promoted only when they fit with the larger goal
of promoting the survival of the modern American state. At the turn of the
twentieth century, courts justified using corporate funds to benefit employees
as a means of fighting the advance of socialism among working men and
women. At the same time, corporations were instructed to maximize profit
for their shareholders as a means of fighting potential manipulation of the
stock market and the economy by the few who controlled corporations.22 In
the midcentury years, concerns about the spread of socialism among workers
or the power of the control group dissipated. With the rise of totalitarian
regimes in Europe, the corporation’s purpose was to support the survival of
American democracy by making charitable contributions to democratic
institutions. Shareholders’ (and other stakeholders’) interests were, for the
most part, subordinated to this end.23 In the later part of the twentieth
century, with no real external threats to the modern American state, scholarly
and judicial attention shifted to the market—that is, the stock market.
Economic threats—specifically, the conglomerates that came to dominate
corporate America and the hostile takeovers that sought to break these
conglomerates—replaced the political threats of socialism and communism.
Amidst rapid market growth and despite mounting demands for corporate
action on a variety of social matters (including, among others, consumer
safety, environmental protection, and racial equality), the courts became
fixated on the limited goal of shareholder wealth maximization—the classical
capitalist profit motive—as a means of ensuring the credence of the stock
market in our global society.24
While Dodge, Steinway, A. P. Smith, Unocal, and Revlon (which will be
discussed in this article) made the law of corporate purpose the thread that
wove corporations into the fabric of American society, it is important to
stress that these cases were among the very few in which state courts
explicitly addressed corporate purpose. As this article suggests, these cases
represent occasions where the courts found ways to bring the academic,
22
23
24

See discussion infra Part I.
See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
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social, and cultural sentiments of the era within the boundaries of corporate
law. Corporate purpose was not a separate doctrine but rather one tied to (or
incorporated within) others, be it the ultra vires doctrine in the early twentieth
century, the enabling business judgment rule by midcentury, or the laws
applicable to evaluating managerial responses to hostile takeovers at the
century’s end. The want of more frequent discussions in the courts about the
corporation’s purpose is perhaps a reflection of the state courts’ reluctance to
critically examine the role of corporations and their managements in modern
American society. Indeed, despite their differing rhetoric, all of these cases
empowered management to set the corporation’s (and society’s) goals without
interference from shareholders, other stakeholders, or the courts.
This article is divided into three parts. The first part, Progressive Grounds,
1900s–1930s, explores the discourse of corporate purpose in the early decades
of the twentieth century. As large publicly held corporations came to
dominate American markets and society, scholars expressed grave concerns
about corporate power and viewed corporate law as a means of taming and
restraining corporate power. Progressive scholars, especially those who
emphasized the social and political role of the corporation, wanted corporate
power to be exercised in trust for the community. In Steinway, the Supreme
Court of New York, Special Term, interpreted the traditional doctrine of ultra
vires to allow corporate managers to exercise corporate power so as to benefit
the public good, specifically to use corporate assets to create programs that
benefited the company’s employees so as to negate the allure of unionization
and socialism.25 At the same time, the growing separation of ownership from
control in the large publicly held corporation triggered concerns about
potential market manipulation by the control group. Scholars such as Adolf
A. Berle argued that, when conflicts between controlling and minority
shareholders arise, corporate law should aim to protect the latter against the
control group’s potential abuse of its market power.26 In Dodge, the Supreme
Court of Michigan, concerned about concentration of wealth and control,
embraced this argument as an exception to Steinway.27 Accordingly,
controlling shareholders could not use their power of control to benefit
themselves or other stakeholders’ interests at the expense of minority
shareholders.
As the second part of this article, From Ultra Vires to Business Judgment,
1940s–1970s, explores, concerns about corporate power and market
25
26
27

See discussion infra Part I.A.
See discussion infra Part I.C.
See discussion infra Part I.B.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473398

162

Virginia Law & Business Review

13:2 (2019)

manipulation by the control group as well as socialism decreased by the 1940s
as corporations’ war efforts and public relations campaigns helped improve
their public image. Gradually, the goal of corporate law shifted from taming
corporate power in the interest of the vulnerable employees or minority
shareholders so as to ensure the success of American capitalism to channeling
corporate power to promote the survival of American democracy. In A. P.
Smith, the Supreme Court of New Jersey endorsed this idea by allowing
management, even against the objection of the corporation’s shareholders, to
make charitable contributions on behalf of the corporation. Like the Supreme
Court of New York in Steinway, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in A. P.
Smith found that the company’s actions were intra vires.28 However, with
federal regulation focusing on the corporation’s impact on the community,
the power of corporate management, rather than the power of the
corporation, quickly became the focus of analysis. Courts moved away from
the question of whether or not the actions of the corporation were ultra vires,
asking instead whether or not corporate managers acted in the best interest of
the corporation. For the most part, the interests of the shareholders (and
other stakeholders) were subsumed under the corporate whole.29
As the third part of this article, Hostile Takeovers and the Shareholder Wealth
Maximization Norm, 1970s to 2000s, explains, by the 1970s and 1980s, the stock
market, a symbol of U.S. economic power, became the focal point for
analysis. Mainstream legal scholars and economists came to believe that the
stock market was the most effective institution to constrain corporate
activities. If policymakers and legal scholars in the early twentieth century
focused on the role of the corporation in fighting socialism, and midcentury
scholars wanted corporate managers to exercise their power for the benefit of
American democracy, jurists in the later part of the twentieth century sought
to ensure the survival of our market economy by focusing on the
stockholders. With no real threats to the modern American state, the only
perceived threat was the threat that corporations themselves could pose to
the market economy. In the 1980s, criticism of conglomerates and fears about
growing numbers of hostile takeovers, presumably intent on breaking down
these large corporations, led the courts to embrace the maximization of
wealth for the shareholders as the ultimate corporate purpose.30
As the article concludes, throughout the twentieth century, the discourse
of corporate purpose has served as a rhetorical tool. Courts turned to the
28
29
30

See discussion infra Parts I.A. and II.A.
See discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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corporation’s purpose to address concerns about socialism in the early
twentieth century, communism in the midcentury years, and the success of
the stock market at its end. In so doing, they helped make the corporation—
itself a potential challenge to classical liberalism and capitalism—these two
ideologies’ representative institution. The early twentieth-century emphasis on
employee benefits, the midcentury focus on charitable contributions, and the
shareholder wealth maximization goal of the late twentieth century have
further served to allow corporate managers to freely exercise their corporate
power, provided that they justified their actions with reference to the ideals or
concerns of the era. Using the rhetoric of corporate purpose, the courts
enabled the exercise of corporate power without interference by corporate
constituencies or the courts.
I. PROGRESSIVE GROUNDS, 1900S–1930S
A. Corporate Power and the Ultra Vires Doctrine
A remarkable growth in the scale of private business organizations took
place at the end of the nineteenth century. Growing consumer demand,
increasing numbers of workers, an expanding pool of capital, and the quickly
developing national railroads and telegraph networks enabled the creation of
large enterprises, while corporate lawyers devised different legal tools to allow
their clients to increase the scope of their operations so as to avoid
destructive competition among large businesses.31 Beginning with New Jersey
in 1888, states changed their corporate laws to “eliminate[] restrictions on . . .
capitalization and assets, mergers and consolidation, the issuance of voting
stock, the purpose(s) of incorporation, and the duration and locale of
business.”32 By the late 1890s, gone were the nineteenth-century legislative
constraints on corporations’ powers, as well as limitations on their capital
structure. Trusts, holding companies, and mergers became common, even if
often contested in state courts.33
31
32
33

Dalia T. Mitchell, Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1503, 1514–15 (2006).
SCOTT R. BOWMAN, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT:
LAW, POWER, AND IDEOLOGY 60 (1996).
On the development of the large publicly held corporation, and the legal changes that
accommodated it, see MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65–107 (1992); see also DOUGLAS M.
EICHAR, THE RISE AND FALL OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 20 (2017)
(discussing the effects of competition on the development of the modern corporation);
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Efforts to control the growing corporations, especially those attempting
to limit corporations’ ability to consolidate, were of little consequence. A
number of states had passed antitrust laws; in 1890, Congress passed the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and in 1898, President McKinley appointed nine
people to the Industrial Commission to study, and hopefully solve, the trust
problem.34 But state corporate laws aimed to fulfill the demands of industrial
corporations, undermining state and federal antitrust regulation.35 As Lyman
Johnson pointedly put it, “legal restrictions were curtailed and corporate
powers were enhanced.”36
Social scientists expressed deep concerns about the power of large
corporations. In 1871, Thomas Cooley cautioned that state enabling laws
allowed “the most enormous and threatening powers in our country” to
flourish.37 Corporations, Cooley warned, were rapidly obtaining “greater
influence in the country at large and upon the legislation of the country than
the States to which they owe their corporate existence.”38 Similarly, in 1913,
an article in the Yale Law Journal began by noting that “[t]he dominion of
corporate power is greater than the general public comprehend, also the evils
which infest these creatures of the law are skillfully and secretly destroying the
inalienable rights of personal liberty while the people are lingering.”39
Economists and lawyers joined in calling for national regulation, and several
federal incorporation bills attempting to constrain the growing corporation
were introduced in Congress during the early decades of the twentieth

34
35

36

37

38
39

JULIA C. OTT, WHEN WALL STREET MET MAIN STREET : THE QUEST FOR AN INVESTORS’
DEMOCRACY 21 (2011) (discussing the growth of the trusts).
OTT, supra note 33, at 21–27.
See EICHAR, supra note 33, at 22–23 (discussing antimonopoly and anti-consolidation
sentiments in the late 1800s); see also HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 80–90 (examining how
the law developed to support consolidation).
Lyman Johnson, Corporate Law and the History of Corporate Social Responsibility, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE HISTORY OF CORPORATE AND COMPANY LAW 570, 581 (Harwell
Wells ed., 2018); see also EICHAR, supra note 33, at 32 (“B]y the 1870s, the large corporation
was poised to take off. Government, however, was poorly positioned to grow in a
corresponding fashion to mandate social responsibility.”).
Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Corporate Privileges for the Public Benefit: The Progressive Federal
Incorporation Movement and the Modern Regulatory State, 77 VA. L. REV. 603, 619 (1991)
(quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH
REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 279 n.2
(3d ed. 1874)).
Id.
J. Newton Baker, The Evil of Special Privilege, 22 YALE L.J. 220 (1913).
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century; however, none were successful, leaving the regulation of corporate
power, for the most part, in the hands of the states.40
Before the 1880s, states regulated the activities of large corporations,
such as banks, by narrowly describing their powers in their charters of
incorporation.41 Private corporations were viewed as artificial entities, created
by a charter or a grant of the state, with the charter being a privilege
selectively conferred by the sovereign on those seeking incorporation. If the
corporation acted outside its prescribed powers, its action was ultra vires and
void.42 By the turn of the twentieth century, the grant or privilege paradigm
lost much of its credibility as states encouraged incorporation in their
territories by reducing the requirement for a state charter into a mere
formality.43 State corporate laws no longer limited the large corporation’s
power but rather enabled its exercise. Corporations were viewed as natural or
real entities, separate from their members (the shareholders), their power
almost unlimited, and their regulation, either by the states or by the federal
government, minimal.44
But the ultra vires doctrine did not disappear. Rather, it lived at least
through the middle of the twentieth century, offering state courts a unique
tool to attempt to channel corporate power toward socially beneficial goals,
while simultaneously determining the purpose of the rapidly growing publicly
held corporation and the power of its managers.45 Critically important at the
end of the nineteenth century, amidst growing labor agitation, were the
corporations’ obligations toward their employees. For one thing, the historic
40
41
42
43

44

45

Davis, supra note 37, at 621–24; see also Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation in the
Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982).
See, e.g., Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1444 (1987).
See, e.g., George Wharton Pepper, The Unauthorized or Prohibited Exercise of Corporate Power, 9
HARV. L. REV. 255, 256 (1895).
See, e.g., Mark, supra note 41, at 1453–54 (describing the nineteenth-century free
incorporation movement that helped erode the idea that corporate charters were a
privilege granted by the state); Charles W. McCurdy, The Knight Sugar Decision of 1895 and
the Modernization of American Corporation Law, 1869–1903, 53 BUS. HIST. REV. 304, 307–08
(1979) (discussing the demise of the charter as a means of controlling corporations).
On the different paradigms or visions of the corporation, see Dalia T. Mitchell,
Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861,
1870–74 (2003); see also Johnson, supra note 36, at 582 (noting that “at the start of the
twentieth century, corporations . . . were economically powerful and regarded as legally
distinct from their associated persons” and “they were not closely regulated (as before) by
state corporation statutes”).
For more information on the rights of shareholders to bring ultra vires suits, see Owen J.
Roberts, The Rights of Stockholders with Reference to the Management of a Corporation, Part III, 37
AM. L. REG. 484 (1898).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473398

166

Virginia Law & Business Review

13:2 (2019)

railroad strike of 1877—the disruption of transportation, the financial losses
suffered by railroads across the United States, and the violent outbreaks—
exacerbated concerns about the relationship between labor and management.
As an 1884 article entitled “Corporations, their Employees, and the Public”
explained, as private corporations were taking on important public functions,
the role and plight of these corporations’ wage workers, who labored to
accomplish these functions, became highly visible.46
Corporate leaders were keen on demonstrating their concern for their
workers, and their commitment to improving their conditions. “The business
corporation . . . takes millions of dollars each year and spends the money for
the benefit of its workmen” wrote Raynal Bolling on behalf of United States
Steel Corporation, counting among such benefits employee stock subscription
plans, accident prevention and relief, medical care, pensions, as well as general
community welfare.47 In his study of corporations’ public relations, Roland
Marchand has explained that large corporations exhibited “compassionate
concern for [their] employees” as a means of demonstrating that they
“possessed human feeling.”48 It was also a means of fighting unionization.49
Given that the control group and management sought to pacify the
corporation’s employees, if only to avoid ruinous strikes, it is perhaps not
surprising that the courts protected programs for employee benefits against
challenges from shareholders, who could easily be described as selfishly
motivated. In Steinway, for example, the Steinway corporation—a family
business located in Manhattan—opened a plant in Astoria, Queens so that it
could expand its operations and, as William Steinway, the corporation’s
president and sole controlling shareholder, explained, “escape the
machinations of the anarchists and socialists . . . [who] were continually
breeding discontent among [Steinway’s] workmen, and inciting them to
strike.”50 In order to retain its skilled labor force and circumvent potential
strikes, “some houses had been constructed in which employees of the
company resided . . . . [T]he company ha[d] also, at a very moderate
expenditure, contributed specific property and money towards the
46
47

48
49
50

Carl Schurz, Corporations, Their Employees, and the Public, 138 N. AM. REV. 101 (1884).
Raynal C. Bolling, The United States Steel Corporation and Labor Conditions, 42 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 38, 38, 39–43 (1912); see also EICHAR, supra note 33, at 43–49
(describing employee benefits programs at the end of the nineteenth century as “voluntary
practices of CSR,” or corporate social responsibility).
ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 15 (2000).
See EICHAR, supra note 33, at 83.
RICHARD K. LIEBERMAN, STEINWAY & SONS 77 (1995) (quoting William Steinway’s
testimony before a Senate Committee on the relations between labor and capital in 1883).
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establishment of a church, a school, a free library, and a free bath . . . .”51 An
ongoing family feud between William Steinway and his nephew, Henry, a
minority shareholder, resulted in several suits, including a shareholder’s suit to
declare Steinway’s expenditures in Astoria wasteful and thus ultra vires. The
Supreme Court of New York dismissed the suit, stating that “[t]he transfer of
their manufactory to the Astoria site was a reasonable exercise of a conceded
discretionary power.”52 As Judge Beekman explained:
As . . . it involved also the transfer of a large number of
operatives, whose well-being was essential to the proper and
efficient performance of their work, and thus to the success
of the corporation, a close and practical business relation
subsisted between the provision made by the defendants for
their employees and the object for which the corporation
was organized . . . . It was also desirable (it may, I think, be
said to have been necessary) to the success of the scheme
that some provision should be made for the moral as well as
the material needs of this new and isolated community, thus
brought, by the exigencies of their employment, into a
measure of social dependence upon their employer.53
Having successfully used the rhetoric of anti-socialism, William Steinway
was free to determine his corporation’s purpose while Steinway became a
leading case on corporate expenditures that benefited employees. Following
Steinway, “[e]xpenditures resulting in stimulating the employees to better work,
and promoting faithfulness and loyalty to the employer,” were rendered
“tributary to the promotion of corporate objects.”54 Corporations could
maintain “relief funds” to support employees injured at work before
Workmen’s Compensation legislation was enacted, as well as pay bonuses to
keep up employee “morale” and encourage more “energetic efforts.”55 In
1909, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, announced that
“[t]he enlightened spirit of the age, based upon the experience of the past, has
thrown upon the employer other duties, which involve a proper regard for

51

52
53
54
55

Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 719 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1896). But see LIEBERMAN,
supra note 50, at 79–80 (noting that, at least in part, William Steinway, the corporation’s
president, built “Steinway Village” so that the corporation could sell and rent homes on
the land it owned in Queens).
Steinway, 40 N.Y.S. at 721.
Id.
Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 136 (1931).
Id. at 137–38.
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the comfort, health, safety and well-being of the employee.”56 And in 1922, in
Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., contributions by a corporation doing
business in Buffalo, New York, to the endowment funds of a college and a
university in Buffalo were deemed intra vires because they would allow for the
creation of opportunities for business training.57 In 1931, an article in the
Columbia Law Review concluded that courts were “more ready to adjudge
gratuitous corporate contributions intra vires where the immediate benefit is
received by employees than in any other situation.”58
Also in line with Steinway, courts and state legislatures extended the
reasoning applicable to employee benefits to “contributions to civic
enterprises of a community dominated by the corporation,” including the
moral needs of the community.59 Often, such expenditures also benefited the
corporation, but, as the court stated in Steinway, they were rendered intra vires
at least in part because “as industrial conditions change, business methods
must change with them, and acts become permissible which, at an earlier
period, would not have been considered to be within corporate power.”60
Corporate law could allow corporate managers to take actions to benefit
community goals, even if doing so was at some expense to the shareholders.
Steinway, as the court described the facts, pitted one of the corporation’s
shareholders against the corporation’s employees—a battle most Progressives
(and Populists) were likely to settle in favor of the latter. Progressives were
rather keen on ensuring that shareholders were held accountable to the
corporation’s different stakeholders, including creditors, consumers and
workers. At the same time, Progressives were also concerned about protecting
individual shareholders against abuses by financiers and those in control of
the large publicly held corporations. As the following section elaborates,
when courts viewed the situation as involving a conflict between controlling
and minority shareholders, they were more inclined to protect the latter and
restrict the exercise of corporate power by the control group.
56
57
58
59

60

People ex. rel. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Hotchkiss, 120 N.Y.S. 649, 651 (N.Y. App. Div.
1909).
Armstrong Cork Co. v. H. A. Meldrum Co., 285 F. 58 (W.D.N.Y. 1922).
Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires, supra note 54, at 136.
Corporations – Charities – Statute Making Contributions to Charity by Corporations Intra Vires, 52
HARV. L. REV. 538, 538 (1939); see also Donations by a Business Corporation as Intra Vires,
supra note 54; Am. Rolling Mill Co. v. Comm’r, 41 F.2d 314, 315–16 (6th Cir. 1930)
(holding that a large community chest contribution to a community where about 50% of
the corporation’s workers lived was intra vires).
Steinway v. Steinway & Sons, 40 N.Y.S. 718, 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1896); see also Theodore
W. Cousens, How Far Corporations May Contribute to Charity, 35 VA. L. REV. 401 (1949)
(explaining the rules applicable to charitable contributions).
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B. Protecting Minority Shareholders
The modern stock market developed in sync with the giant corporation.
Beginning in the merger wave of the 1890s, corporations found ways to
convince investors, typically of middle-class background, to invest—first, in
bonds, and then, by the second decade of the twentieth century, in corporate
stock.61 In the process, “the practice of investment [was linked] with national
citizenship, democracy and the public interest.”62 As James B. Dill, the lawyer
who drafted New Jersey’s first enabling corporate law, noted, selling shares to
the public went “a long way to winning the loyalty of the middle classes to a
new incorporated system of private property.”63
These new investors had little effect on corporate affairs. Doctrinal
changes, including the gradual erosion of the ultra vires doctrine, the
reintroduction of the idea that the board’s power was original rather than
delegated from the shareholders, and the elimination of the shareholders’
right to remove directors at will, helped minimize shareholder control.64
Proxy voting became the norm, and states enacted laws allowing a majority of
the shareholders to approve a sale of corporate assets, abolishing the
nineteenth century rule requiring a unanimous vote to effect fundamental
transactions.65 The newly legalized holding company further undermined
shareholders’ power by allowing one corporation to control the majority of
stock of many direct and indirect subsidiaries through pyramiding.66
Limitations on the voting rights of certain classes of shareholders, including
non-voting stock and conditional voting stock, also became common in the
first decades of the twentieth century.67 As early as 1904, Thorstein Veblen

61
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64
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Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1519–20.
HO, supra note 20, at 180.
Id. at 181. For more information on the history of the stock market, see CHARLES R.
GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY (1997).
See HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 77–78, 99.
Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1522; see also Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations,
Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 907–09 (2004) (noting how
changes in corporate voting rules during the late nineteenth century weakened
shareholder control).
Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1526; Winkler, supra note 65, at 907. The classic treatise on the
holding company remains JAMES C. BONBRIGHT & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE HOLDING
COMPANY: ITS PUBLIC SIGNIFICANCE AND ITS REGULATION (1932).
Mitchell, supra note 31, at 1526–27. For a detailed analysis of the changes described in this
paragraph, see HORWITZ, supra note 33, at 77–90.
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noted that “under corporate organization the owners of the industrial material
have no voice in its management.”68
Moreover, while share ownership became more dispersed and businesses
grew in size, their control was concentrated. In 1913, the report of the Pujo
(Banking and Currency) Committee announced the existence of a money
trust, consisting of a small number of financiers sitting on multiple corporate
boards. According to the report, these financiers controlled the economy with
the assistance of the New York Stock Exchange, which allowed practices
such as pooling and other stock price manipulation techniques to the
detriment of working- and middle-class individual investors.69 In 1932, in The
Modern Corporation and Private Property—modern corporate law’s foundational
text—Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means noted that “[o]wnership of
wealth without appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable
ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development.”70
The separation of ownership from control exacerbated Progressive
scholars’ concerns about corporate power. The multiplicity of owners created
“tremendous aggregations of property,” which made possible such buildups
of power (in the hands of the control group).71 The possibility of mass
concentration of power augmented the risk of inefficient uses of power and
the potential adverse effect of corporations on the economy at large.72
The separation of ownership from control also rendered Progressive legal
scholars deeply concerned about potential abuse of power by the control
group. In 1911, an article titled Evils of Corporate Control declared that “[t]he
facility with which capital passes under the control of strong groups of
individuals creates one of the most serious problems of modern times.”73 In
1927, William Z. Ripley pointed out that “the larger the number of
shareholders, the more easily may a small concentrated block of minority
shares exercise sway over all the rest.”74 And in 1932, when Berle and Means
called attention to the growing separation of ownership from control in large
68
69
70
71
72

73
74

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 146 (1904).
See OTT, supra note 33, at 32–33.
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 69.
Id. at 5.
Id. Because Berle and Means’s argument focused on publicly held corporations (which
Berle labeled quasi-public), they viewed the consolidation of power and the separation of
ownership from control as interrelated phenomena. Id. (“The Fords and the Mellons,
whose personal wealth is sufficient to finance great enterprises, are so few, that they only
emphasize the dependence of the large enterprise on the wealth of more than the
individual or group of individuals who may be in control.”).
William E. Harmon, Evils of Corporate Control, 2 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y.C. 48 (1911).
WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 95 (1927).
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business corporations, they pointedly explained that individual shareholders
lost control not only to management but also to larger investors who, even
without owning a majority of the shares, were able to elect the board of
directors.75 That same year, the Pecora Hearings in Congress found
“irrefutable evidence of market manipulation by corporate officers and
investment bankers.”76
Calls for state and federal legislation to protect minority investors were
heard at least since the turn of the twentieth century, becoming more vocal by
the end of the First World War as corporations were trying to lure “citizeninvestors holding excess cash from Liberty bond, War Savings, or
Government Savings redemptions and interest payments.”77 Courts
supplemented such calls by holding those in control to a strict fiduciary
obligation toward minority shareholders.78 The issue was not whether the
exercise of corporate power was ultra vires, but rather whether the control
group fulfilled its duties toward minority shareholders. For example, in
Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, Justice Brandeis wrote:
The rule of corporation law and of equity invoked is well
settled and has been often applied. The majority has the right
to control; but when it does so, it occupies a fiduciary
relation toward the minority, as much so as the corporation
itself or its officers and directors. If through that control a
sale of the corporate property is made and the property
acquired by the majority, the minority may not be excluded
from a fair participation in the fruits of the sale.79

75
76

77
78
79

See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 69–111 (detailing the changing composition of the
control group).
Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and Corporate Governance at
the End of History, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 113 (2004). A few years later, William O.
Douglas would label the interests of investment banking houses “high finance,” charging
that they were “interested solely in the immediate profit.” WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, The
Forces of Disorder, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE: THE ADDRESSES AND PUBLIC
STATEMENTS OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 7 (James Allen ed., 1940). According to Douglas,
the interests of high finance were different from those of small individual shareholders, or
even the corporation. Id. at 9. With the power of control, high finance was able to profit
by siphoning money from other investors. Id.
OTT, supra note 33, at 127.
See Douglas K. Moll, Of Donahue and Fiduciary Duty: Much Ado About . . . ?, 33 W. NEW
ENG. L. REV. 471, 471–72 (2011).
S. Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1919).
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Dodge, “[o]ne of the most famous corporate cases of all time,”80 conveyed
a similar sentiment. In 1903, the Dodge brothers, then owners of an autoparts making business, entered an exclusive agreement to supply parts to the
Ford Motor Company. At the time, Ford could not pay for the initial parts,
and instead offered the Dodge brothers fifty shares each of the Ford Motor
Company’s stock in exchange for their notes of $5,000 each.81 The Ford
Motor Company was extremely successful in the following decade, and the
Dodge brothers, as shareholders, received large amounts of special
dividends.82 Over time, the company also reduced the price of its Model T
car, “from $900 at the outset to $440 in 1916, each year selling more
automobiles than the year before.”83 But in 1916, Ford had decided to stop
paying special dividends, announcing that he intended to put the profits back
into the company, hire more employees, and further reduce the price of Ford
cars.84 “‘My ambition,’ said Mr. Ford, ‘is to employ still more men, to spread
the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest possible number, to help
them build up their lives and their homes. To do this we are putting the
greatest share of our profits back in the business.’”85 The Dodge brothers,
who by 1913 stopped making parts for the Ford Motor Company and began
manufacturing their cars, sued, claiming that Ford’s actions turned the
company into a semi-eleemosynary institution in violation of its charter.86
Chief Justice Ostrander held for the Dodge brothers stating:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the
directors are to be employed for that end. The discretion of
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain
that end, and does not extend to a change in the end itself, to
the reduction of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits
among stockholders in order to devote them to other
purposes.87
Why weren’t the expenditures planned by Ford in Dodge treated similarly
to the ones in Steinway? Was the corporation not benefiting from higher
80
81
82
83
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85
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Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases,
2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 831, 833.
M. Todd Henderson, The Story of Dodge v. Ford Motor Company: Everything Old is New
Again, in CORPORATE LAW STORIES 37, 47–48 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2009).
Miller, supra note 80, at 833.
Id.
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 465, 490, 505 (1919).
Id. at 505.
Id. at 504; Miller, supra note 80, at 835.
Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507.
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morale (and less agitation) among employees? Were sales not up due to the
reduction in car prices? Proponents of the shareholder wealth maximization
vision of the corporation have argued that Dodge clearly stated that the
corporation’s sole purpose was to maximize profit for the shareholders.88
Others, however, have pointed out that the decision did not require directors
to maximize profits for the shareholders but only limited directors’ discretion
to share corporate profits with stakeholders other than the shareholders.89
Most pointedly, Lynn Stout has suggested that law professors stop teaching
the decision because it was a “mistake.”90
Geoffrey Miller has written that “[t]he back-story, which is dimly
apparent in the opinion itself, is that the fight between Ford and the Dodges
had little to do with the fiduciary duties of managers and much to do with
competition between commercial rivals.”91 A closer look at the paragraph
including the famous quote mentioned above suggests more. The paragraph
began with a nod to cases such as Steinway which, according to the Supreme
Court of Michigan, raised the question as to whether “the directors were not
acting for the best interests of the corporation.”92 “We do not draw in
question . . . the soundness of the opinions delivered in the cases cited,” Chief
Justice Ostrander wrote, because “[t]he case presented here [was] not like any
of them.”93 While, according to the court, Steinway and similar cases addressed
the duties of directors (and the corporation) toward the general public, Dodge
focused on the relationship between controlling and minority shareholders.94
“There should be no confusion (of which there is evidence),” Ostrander
stressed, “of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he and the
stockholders owe to the general public and the duties which in law he and his
codirectors owe to protesting, minority stockholders.”95 The duty to
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See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm: A
Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993).
See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733,
772–75 (2005).
Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 163, 166
(2008) (noting not only that the case does not stand for the proposition that “the
corporate purpose is, or should be, maximizing shareholder wealth,” but also that it is “a
doctrinal oddity largely irrelevant to corporate law and corporate practice”).
Miller, supra note 80, at 835.
Dodge, 204 Mich. at 506.
Id.
Id. at 506–07; see also D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J. CORP. L. 277,
315–20 (1998).
Dodge, 204 Mich. at 507.
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maximize profit to the shareholders applied only in the latter context.96 As
Ostrander was quick to emphasize:
There is committed to the discretion of directors, a
discretion to be exercised in good faith, the infinite details of
business, including the wages which shall be paid to
employees, the number of hours they shall work, the
conditions under which labor shall be carried on, and the
price for which products shall be offered to the public.97
In short, Dodge’s focus on the protection of shareholders, specifically
minority shareholders, against abuses by the control group reflected the
common early twentieth-century concern about the power that the control
group could exercise over the vulnerable minority shareholders (and the
market more broadly). It was this concern that led the court to emphasize that
“[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit
of the stockholders.”98 As the court saw it, Ford’s rhetoric of corporate social
responsibility masked an attempt to harm the Dodge brothers, the minority
shareholders. Unlike William Steinway’s attempt to ensure peaceful working
conditions and fight the appeal of socialism, Ford’s rhetoric seemed to reject
one of the most important tenets of capitalism—the profit motive.99 Fears
about the power of concentrated control led the court to carve out an
exception to the rule that management held the power to determine the
corporation’s (and corporate law’s) purpose. Together, Steinway and Dodge are
emblematic of the early twentieth-century unease with the dual problems of
corporate power and market manipulation by the control group. Both cases
also empowered corporate managers to determine corporate purpose
provided that their justification did not conflict with the corporation’s
perceived role in the modern American state.
The decade that followed Dodge witnessed an “unprecedented influx of
new investors into the stock market.”100 In the early part of the 1920s,
corporations marketed their shares directly, especially to their employees and
customers, “in the hopes of repelling unionization and federal intrusions into
labor relations” as well as deflecting antitrust suits.101 By the second part of
96
97
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100
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Id.
Id.
Id.
See WILLIAM PELFREY, BILLY, ALFRED, AND GENERAL MOTORS: THE STORY OF TWO
UNIQUE MEN, A LEGENDARY COMPANY, AND A REMARKABLE TIME IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 121 (2006).
OTT, supra note 33, at 169.
Id. at 152.
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the 1920s, financial firms began to encourage investment in stock “as a
mechanism for subjecting corporate capitalism to democratic discipline.”102
The growing numbers of individual investors exacerbated the tensions
between the corporation’s duties to its minority shareholders and its social
obligations.
As the following section elaborates, in the early 1930s, the problems of
corporate power and corporate control animated the famous debate between
Adolf Berle and E. Merrick Dodd. Influenced by corporate managers’ own
assertions about their role, Dodd emphasized the corporation’s obligations
toward the community at large. In turn, growing fears about potential abuses
by the control group (and perhaps a more cynical view of corporate
managers’ proclamations) led Berle to call for extending fiduciary obligations
only toward the shareholders. Yet, as I further argue, while Berle and Dodd
advocated different visions of the corporation’s purpose, both viewed the
doctrine of fiduciary obligations (rather than ultra vires) as the site where
corporate purpose was to be found. In so doing they, perhaps inadvertently,
helped undermine fears about corporate power. In explicitly relying upon
management’s view of the law of corporate purpose, Dodd’s argument also
paved the path for the courts’ midcentury endorsement of corporate
management’s absolute discretion to determine corporate ends.
C. Of Debates and Legacies
Adolf Berle fully recognized the conflicting pulls of taming corporate
power and restraining the power of management and the control group, of
the needs of the community and the needs of the shareholders.103 As Scott
Bowman explained, Berle saw two dimensions of corporate power: an
internal one and an external one.104 The internal dimension focused on the
power of corporations over individuals within them, and more specifically,
the corporations’ power over employment decisions.105 In contrast, the
external dimension emphasized corporations’ impact on society at large,
particularly corporations’ power to control markets.106 In The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, the book Berle co-authored with Gardiner
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 169; see also JONATHAN BARRON BASKIN & PAUL J. MIRANTI, JR., A HISTORY OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 189–97 (1997).
See C.A. Harwell Wells, The Cycles of Corporate Social Responsibility: An Historical Retrospective
for the Twenty-First Century, 51 KAN. L. REV. 77, 87 (2002).
BOWMAN, supra note 32, at 207; see also BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21, at 7.
BOWMAN, supra note 32, at 207.
Id. at 208.
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Means, Berle was especially concerned about corporate power and the
challenge that corporations presented to classical liberal thought.107 The book
concluded by proclaiming that shareholders, “by surrendering control and
responsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the
corporation should be operated in their sole interest,—they have released the
community from the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in
the doctrine of strict property rights.”108 Accordingly:
Should the corporate leaders, for example, set forth a
program comprising fair wages, security to employees, reasonable
service to their public, and stabilization of business, all of
which would divert a portion of the profits from the owners
of passive property, and should the community generally
accept such a scheme as a logical and human solution of
industrial difficulties, the interests of passive property owners would
have to give way.109
A year earlier, however, in Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, Berle
announced that corporate powers should be exercised in trust for the
shareholders.110 Just as with Steinway and Dodge, Berle’s seemingly
contradicting positions were grounded in the dual concerns about corporate
power and corporate control and their implication for the modern American
state. It was Dodd’s article, For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, the only
public response to Berle’s article, which polarized Berle’s vision and the
twentieth century’s discourse of corporate purpose.111
Dodd’s vision of corporate management was one of public service. Dodd
wanted to validate corporate social policies that benefited different
constituencies, including employees, consumers, investors and the community
at large, even when such policies resulted in diminution of profits for the
shareholders.112 Announcing that he was “thoroughly in sympathy with Mr.
Berle’s efforts to establish a legal control which [would] more effectually
prevent corporate managers from diverting profit into their own pockets
from those of stockholders,” Dodd stated that the corporation nonetheless
had “social service as well as a profit-making function.”113
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See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 356 (emphasis added).
See Berle, Corporate Powers, supra note 13.
See Dodd, supra note 13.
Id.
Id. at 1147–48.
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To support his argument, Dodd relied upon statements made by
corporate managers, particularly Owen D. Young, chairman of the board and
president of General Electric. Young, who believed that “life insurance,
company health care, mortgage assistance, and worker grievance boards,”
could “nurture employee loyalty, and most importantly, avoid unions,”114
argued that the corporation should recognize its “public obligations and
perform its public duties—in a word, vast as it is, that it should be a good
citizen.”115 Similarly, Dodd noted that, in giving charters to corporations, the
state had created “e pluribus unum”—“[i]f the unity of the corporate body is
real, then there is reality and not simply legal fiction in the proposition that
the managers of the unit are fiduciaries for it and not merely for its individual
members, that they are . . . trustees for an institution rather than attorneys for
the stockholders.”116
As the above quote from The Modern Corporation and Private Property
indicates, Berle did not disagree. Yet, his argument in Corporate Powers as Powers
in Trust focused elsewhere, drawing upon Berle’s earlier work on the
relationship between directors, officers and individual shareholders and the
need to eliminate the potential for market manipulation by the control
group.117 In 1925, Berle called attention to the fact that because management
stock would likely be controlled by the investment banking house that served
as a promoter for the corporation, “it [was] possible, if not probable, that
there [would] be attractive opportunities for manipulation of securities, for
negotiating favorable contracts with allied interests, or even for giving value
to stock which represent[ed] no real investment.”118 According to Berle, given
the “web of economic interests” that the investment banking house served
and from which it made its profits, it was likely that management stock would
be voted for transactions that benefited the investment banking house, or
even the controlling groups, but not the controlled corporation.119
In 1931, wishing himself to be the “Marx of the shareholder class,”120
Berle wanted to protect those not in control of the corporate machinery from
114
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EICHAR, supra note 33, at 1.
Dodd, supra note 13, at 1154 (citation omitted).
Id. at 1160; see also David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 216–18
(1990).
See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control,” 39 HARV. L. REV. 673
(1926); see also Wells, supra note 103, at 87–88.
Berle, supra note 117, at 676.
Id.
JORDAN A. SCHWARZ, LIBERAL: ADOLF A. BERLE AND THE VISION OF AN AMERICAN ERA
62 (1987); see also NAVIGATING THE RAPIDS, 1918–1971: FROM THE PAPERS OF ADOLF A.
BERLE 26 (Beatrice Bishop Berle & Travis Beal Jacobs eds., 1973).
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fraud and manipulative practices that seemed to plague the securities markets.
He wanted to rein in the power of the control group. The article Corporate
Powers as Powers in Trust focused on the power to issue stock, the power to
declare dividends, the power to amend the charter, and the power to engage
in fundamental transactions.121 While the courts had previously considered
each of these powers a matter of contract law and thus susceptible to
statutory changes (and the possibility of opting out), Berle wanted to make
these powers a matter of the control group’s trusteeship duties.122
In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle’s analysis focused on
corporate power, and his conclusions were similar to Dodd’s. However, Berle
was concerned about “the apparently unlimited powers conferred on
corporate management by recently enacted corporation statutes and charter
provisions.”123 He also had little faith in the assertions made by corporate
managers regarding their role. Young, whose ideas influenced Dodd’s
writings, developed the rhetoric of trust to convey that management was a
profession that could mediate the different interests involved in the corporate
endeavor.124 Yet, while Young described business managers as trustees for
society, he also argued that, as a result, they required little if any supervision
from the states or the federal government.125 As Allen Kaufman and
Lawrence Zacharias have noted, “[t]he business community would not fully
live up to Young’s expectations; but it did take advantage of Young’s trustee
argument,” with “managers represent[ing] themselves through Young’s
model.”126
Recognizing the limits of the business community’s trustee argument,
Berle pointed out that “[t]he industrial ‘control’ does not now think of himself
as a prince; he does not now assume responsibilities to the community; his
bankers do not now undertake to recognize social claims; his lawyers do not
advise him in terms of social responsibility.”127 Lessening the control group’s
obligations toward the shareholders would thus make the power of control
absolute. As Berle put it, “[y]ou can not abandon the emphasis on ‘the view
that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for
121
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their stockholders’ until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and
reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to someone else.”128
Given that the Berle-Dodd debate has since been viewed as the beginning
point for discussions of corporate purpose, it is easy to lose track of the
definition of corporate purpose as it was in the early 1930s, shortly after the
stock market crash. The differences between Berle’s and Dodd’s positions are
significant, but the similarities are also important. Both were concerned about
corporate power and the means to discipline it.129 Both also placed trust, not
ultra vires, at the center of the law of corporate purpose. Stringent fiduciary
obligations were to supplement federal regulation and state legislation to
ensure that corporate power was exercised to achieve socially acceptable
goals, be it community welfare or minority shareholder protection.130 The
doctrine of ultra vires had allowed Progressive legal scholars and judges in the
early decades of the twentieth century to embrace the duties of corporations
toward their employees and the duties of corporate managers toward the
shareholders as complementary. Both Berle and Dodd began to alter this
framework by shifting the debates away from ultra vires toward fiduciary
obligations.
In the end, the idea that corporate law’s purpose was to enforce
trusteeship duties was very short-lived. Partially because scholars offered
different visions as to whom directors were trustees and provided no concrete
plan as to how the idea of trust would be implemented, partially because the
business community used the concept of trust to promote its own agenda,
and partially because the courts have struggled at least since the midnineteenth century to define the role of the board of directors, the idea did
not take hold in state courts.131
The early twentieth-century concerns about corporate power and control
also dissipated shortly after the Berle-Dodd debate. As the following part
explores, by the late 1930s, concerns about socialism and unionization waned,
and the law of corporate purpose became entangled with a new discourse of
democracy that came to dominate the social sciences beginning in the 1940s.
A vision of corporations as quintessentially American substantiated this
128
129

130
131

Id.
See Mitchell, supra note 44, at 1891–96. Reflecting the early twentieth-century concerns
about socialism, both Berle and Dodd also sought alternatives to the concept of a
permanent wage-labor working class as a means of taming corporate power (be it Dodd’s
managerial class or Berle’s shareholder class). Id.
Kaufman & Zacharias, supra note 124, at 532–33.
See generally Dalia T. Mitchell, Status Bound: The Twentieth Century Evolution of Directors’
Liability, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 63, 103–08 (2009).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3473398

180

Virginia Law & Business Review

13:2 (2019)

discourse. In this context, the courts not only relied upon management’s own
vision of its obligations to develop a purpose for corporate law and
corporations but also used the developing business judgment rule to make
management’s (almost) absolute discretion the foundation of corporate law.

II. FROM ULTRA VIRES TO BUSINESS JUDGMENT, 1940S–1970S
A. The Charitable Corporation
The programs adopted during the first phase of the New Deal aimed to
bring relief and recovery through government planning and coordination.132
These programs were grounded in the realization, as Louis Jaffe put it, that
“the most significant and powerful components of the social structure [were]
economic groups, competing and complementary in varying degrees;”133 their
thrust was to curb ruinous competition among business and instead achieve
cooperation through governmental coordination.134 As Means put it, the goal
was not to “make the market effective as a coordinator,” which would have
required “revers[ing] the trend of a century and break[ing] the large units into
a multitude of smaller enterprises.”135 Rather, the early New Deal programs
were designed to keep in place the large units and increase “the element of
administrative coordination of economic activity rather than its
elimination.”136
Neither the business community nor advocates of broader corporate
reforms celebrated the early New Deal programs, be it the Securities Acts of
1933 and 1934 or the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. Progressive
reformers believed these programs were insufficient solutions to the
problems that plagued the economy, while the business community feared
potential liability, especially under the Securities Acts.137 Within a few years,
however, these programs helped alleviate the fears about corporate power
and the power of control that characterized the early decades of the twentieth
132
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134
135
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century.138 In regulating the corporation’s dealings with its shareholders and
its creditors, the Securities Acts alleviated earlier concerns about market
manipulation by the control group.139 At the same time, the Federal Trade
Commission guaranteed consumers “fair” competition, while the National
Labor Relations Act ensured that workers had the power to bargain
collectively.140
After the unexpected economic recession of 1937, New Dealers
abandoned their regulatory vision of the modern state and instead adopted a
compensatory vision. They no longer wanted the federal government to
coordinate economic activity, but rather envisioned the government as
redressing the “weaknesses and imbalances in the private economy without
directly confronting the internal workings of capitalism.”141 The state was to
“manage the economy without managing the institutions of the economy.”142
As President Roosevelt put it, the government’s role was to spend capital “to
increase [the] public wealth and to build up the health and strength of the
people,” in order “to help [the] system of private enterprise to function.”143 A
vision of a free market, compensated by the state’s fiscal hand on rare
occasions, began to dominate economic thought.144
At the same time, the public image of corporations and their
managements was changing. War production and the development of new
industries (particularly electronics and communications) helped eliminate
corporate debt, allowed corporations to cut prices, introduced new
management techniques, and made corporations more likely to assume public
responsibilities.145 Corporations were embraced as dominant economic, social
and political institutions. The concerns of earlier decades were forgotten, and
138
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the alliance between business and the federal government was
strengthened.146 No longer a potential threat to the modern American state,
the publicly held corporation became its quintessential institution. In 1946,
Peter Drucker wrote that the corporation was not merely an economic
organization, but “[America’s] representative social institution.”147 As such, it
strove to fulfill “the aspirations and beliefs of the American people.”148 For
one thing, General Motors, the focus of Drucker’s study of the corporation,
proclaimed its intent to spend $500 million on products and facilities to meet
the needs of the American public after the war.149 The corporation, Drucker
wrote, was “the institution which sets the standard for the way of life and the
mode of living of our citizens; which leads, molds and directs; which
determines our perspective on our own society; around which crystallize our
social problems and to which we look for their solution.”150
Social demands on corporations changed, too. In the early decades of the
twentieth century, courts used the doctrine of the implied powers of the
corporation to help channel corporate power toward socially beneficial goals,
specifically to justify corporations’ contributions to the needs and morale of
their employees even when the benefits to the corporation were indirect.151
But in the postwar years, with federal programs to protect employees and no
real fears about labor unrest, the discourse of corporate purpose was no
longer focused on the needs and morale of the corporation’s employees.
Instead, attention shifted to charitable contributions.
At the turn of the twentieth century, there were few, if any, statutes
authorizing corporate charitable contributions.152 Such contributions were
deemed ultra vires unless the corporation received a benefit.153 Dodge, discussed
in the previous part, has indeed been described as a case in which charitable
contributions were rejected because the corporation did not receive such a
benefit.154
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In the 1920s, state corporation laws began to allow corporations to make
charitable contributions while Congress extended to corporations “the right
to deduct charitable contributions from gross income.”155 By 1949, thirteen
states had passed legislation sanctioning corporate charitable contributions,
albeit with specific restrictions, including limits on the allowed annual
amounts of such contributions.156 By 1950, a provision allowing corporate
philanthropy was included in the Model Business Corporation Act; it
permitted “donations for the public welfare or for charitable, scientific or
educational purposes; and in time of war.”157 Many states adopted similar
provisions in their corporation laws.158
It was not long before state courts were called upon to evaluate the merit
and legal propriety of these statutes and of corporate charitable contributions
and corporate purpose more broadly. In 1951, the National Association of
Manufacturers, seeking a court resolution on the propriety of corporate
contributions to higher education, brought a test case before the New Jersey
Supreme Court in which A. P. Smith Manufacturing Company (“A. P.
Smith”) sought a judgment declaring such contributions intra vires.159
A. P. Smith was incorporated in 1896 for the “manufacture and sale of
valves, fire hydrants and special equipment, mainly for water and gas
industries.”160 “Over the years the company has contributed regularly to the
local community chest and on occasions to Upsala College in East Orange
and Newark University, now part of Rutgers, the State University.”161 Then,
in July of 1951, the board of directors of A. P. Smith determined that it was
“in the corporation’s best interests to join with others in the 1951 Annual
Giving to Princeton University,” and authorized the transfer of 1,500 dollars
to the university “as a contribution towards its maintenance.”162 Mr. Hubert
F. O’Brien, the company’s president, asserted that “he considered the
contribution to be a sound investment, that the public expects corporations
to aid philanthropic and benevolent institutions, that they obtain good will in
the community by so doing, and that their charitable donations create
155
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157
158
159
160
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favorable environment for their business operations.”163 O’Brien further
testified that “in contributing to liberal arts institutions, corporations were
furthering their self-interest in assuring the free flow of properly trained
personnel for administrative and other corporate employment.”164
O’Brien’s testimony echoed the sentiment of the business community. In
1947, a report by the Commission on Higher Education noted the
importance of institutions of higher education “for economic opportunity
and political freedom,” and stressed the need for private giving as well as
federal aid to sustain these institutions.165 Concerned about growing federal
(administrative) involvement, business “heavyweights” actively promoted
“business support of higher education [as] infinitely preferable to federal
aid.”166 Corporations were “urged to displace the Federal Government” in
“meeting the financial needs of higher education.”167 Other corporate leaders
chimed in to support O’Brien’s testimony:
Mr. Frank W. Abrams, chairman of the board of the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, testified that
corporations are expected to acknowledge their public
responsibilities in support of the essential elements of our
free enterprise system. . . . Mr. Irving S. Olds, former
chairman of the board of the United States Steel
Corporation, pointed out that corporations have a selfinterest in the maintenance of liberal education as the
bulwark of good government. . . . Similarly, Dr. Harold W.
Dodds, President of Princeton University . . . stated that
“democratic society will not long endure if it does not
nourish within itself strong centers of non-governmental
fountains of knowledge, opinions of all sorts not
governmentally or politically originated.”168
The New Jersey Supreme Court could have resolved the matter without
reference to this testimony. A 1930 statutory provision permitted New Jersey
corporations to make charitable contributions.169 A. P. Smith was formed in
1896, more than three decades before the provision was enacted. Yet, as the
Court noted, “[f]ifty years before the incorporation of The A. P. Smith
163
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Manufacturing Company [the New Jersey] Legislature provided that every
corporate charter thereafter granted ‘shall be subject to alteration, suspension
and repeal, in the discretion of the legislature.’ . . . A similar reserved power
was placed into [the New Jersey] Constitution in 1875.”170 Due to this
reservation of power provision, the 1930 legislation could apply, retroactively,
to A. P. Smith.171
Justice Jacobs preferred to make a broader statement, one that reached
beyond statutory interpretation. While referencing the statutory provisions
toward the end of his decision, Justice Jacobs, in deference to business leaders
and university officials, chose to offer an exposé of the corporation’s role
(and corporate purpose) in midcentury American society. Relying on
testimony of O’Brien and other business leaders, the court noted the
important role corporations played in American history:
During the first world war corporations loaned their
personnel and contributed substantial corporate funds in
order to insure survival; during the depression of the ‘30s
they made contributions to alleviate the desperate hardships
of the millions of unemployed; and during the second world
war they again contributed to insure survival. They now
recognize that we are faced with other, though nonetheless
vicious, threats from abroad which must be withstood
without impairing the vigor of our democratic institutions at
home and that otherwise victory will be pyrrhic indeed.
More and more they have come to recognize that their
salvation rests upon sound economic and social environment
which in turn rests in no insignificant part upon free and
vigorous nongovernmental institutions of learning.172
Justice Jacobs’ reference to “our democratic institutions at home” and his
insistence that corporations were the foundation upon which American
democracy could thrive173 reflected the midcentury obsession with democratic
theory. As Morton Horwitz has explained, in the 1940s, democracy emerged
“as a basic concept in American constitutional law” as American social
scientists wondered why and how “America had managed to avoid
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succumbing to European totalitarianism.”174 In 1953, when A. P. Smith was
decided, the Korean War and the Cold War, more broadly, were vicious
“threats from abroad which must be withstood without impairing the vigor of
our democratic institutions at home.”175 Just as political and legal theorists
struggled to explain the contrast between democratic and non-democratic
societies, corporations (and their managers) were quick to claim their unique
role in ensuring the survival of the former. As two members of the
Pennsylvania Bar succinctly put it two decades later: “As money and power
have become concentrated in corporate enterprises, those enterprises have
become an increasingly critical source of funds for public works, and
corporate decisions have come increasingly to determine the quality of
American life. This has not been overlooked by the managers or by the
courts.”176
A. P. Smith examined the question of charitable contributions using the
rapidly disappearing nineteenth-century doctrine of ultra vires, a doctrine
focused on corporate power. Viewed as critical for ensuring the survival of
American democracy, charitable contributions were not only intra vires but
also best left to managerial discretion. Management could choose to make
certain contributions, despite shareholders’ disapproval, but it was not
required to do so, even if the shareholders so wished. Corporations and their
managements were free to exercise their power, with or without their
shareholders’ consent. In 1954, two decades after his public deliberation with
Dodd, Berle asserted that Dodd had won the debate.177 As Berle, perhaps
cynically, put it, corporations had developed a conscience; “modern directors
[were] not limited to running business enterprise for maximum profit, but
[were] in fact and recognized in law as administrators of a community
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system.”178 Corporate managers’ authority to run the corporation could not
be challenged.
Corporations were not equipped to determine social priorities and lacked
any democratic authority to do so,179 but the statements of corporate leaders
insinuated that responsible corporate management could reconcile the
corporation’s interest with the public good and help the nation.180 The
endorsement of such statements by the judiciary helped consolidate and
legitimate corporate power against internal and external challenges. As the
following section elaborates, in endorsing the vision that corporate leaders
articulated for corporations, the courts also helped substantiate the ideology
of managerialism that came to characterize corporate law in the midcentury
years. With managerialism, questions involving corporate purpose were no
longer examined using the ultra vires framework; rather, they were subsumed
within the doctrines of management’s fiduciary obligations and business
judgment. Concerns about the power of the control group or management
disappeared. Corporate managers’ decisions regarding the corporation’s goals
were almost guaranteed to be upheld, provided that they did not constitute a
waste of corporate assets.
B. The Socially Responsible Managerial Class
By the 1940s and 1950s, expert management became the “strategic
center” of the large publicly held corporation.181 While shareholders grew
numerous (and passive), management took center stage. As Richard
Hofstadter pointed out, “business structure has brought into being a
managerial class of immense social and political as well as market power.”182
Management dominated the corporate bureaucracy, organized production,
and exercised power over individual lives within the corporation and market
transactions outside it.183 The term “free enterprise,” in use since the 1930s,
became associated with the free reign of managers who, in the cultural
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imagination, replaced the small produces and entrepreneurs of the nineteenth
century.184
Business experts asserted that corporations were to be managed by
multiple loyal leaders, “men of ability and initiative” capable of fighting or
evading “bureaucratic ossification and bureaucratic timidity” and pursuing
corporate policy.185 Drawing on his study of General Motors, Peter Drucker
concluded that corporations should combine “corporate unity” with
“divisional autonomy and responsibility,” and aim to realize “unity through
local self-government and vice versa.”186 Senior managers were viewed as
capable of balancing the different needs of the corporation’s various divisions
and constituencies, and Drucker stressed the need to free management from
“legal subservience to both shareholders and directors.”187
According to Drucker, General Motors was a successful model of
genuine federalism. General Motors did not have “a clear division of
powers,” but what the corporation lacked in centralized authority, efficient
markets corrected.188 The freedom and flexibility exercised by divisional
management was constrained by the objective framework of “modern
methods of cost accounting and market analysis as an impersonal yardstick to
measure achievement of both policy-makers and production men.”189
Departments such as consumer relations, dealer relations, and community
relations were instrumental in keeping corporate executives in touch with
their communities and the corporation’s broader social and economic role.190
Still, the most important characteristic of a successful organization was its
leadership. Drucker believed that “[t]he ability of an institution to produce
leaders is more important than its ability to produce efficiently and
cheaply.”191 As he explained, “without an able, responsible and enterprising
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leadership, willing and capable of taking the initiative, the most efficient
institution cannot maintain its efficiency, let alone increase it.”192
Social and political critics pointed to the power inequities that permeated
American corporations in the postwar years and that were reinforced by the
celebration of managerialism. C. Wright Mills decried “the rise of an elite of
power” whose “decisions . . . carry more consequences for more people than
has ever been the case in the world history of mankind.”193 According to
Mills, the postwar years witnessed “[t]he top of the American system of
power . . . [becoming] much more unified and much more powerful, the
bottom . . . much more fragmented, and in truth, impotent.”194 And Gabriel
Kolko described the regulatory laws of the Progressive era as reflecting the
efforts of conservative corporate leaders to maintain the social and political
status quo amidst changing economic conditions.195 The modern American
state was accordingly the result of business efforts to explain capitalism in a
way that allowed the corporate elite to maximize their profits.196
But even staunch critics were not able to undermine the general
acceptance of managerialism. Worried about totalitarianism, and later, the
Cold War, the majority of midcentury scholars discounted concerns about
business and its potential threat to democracy and instead assumed a
harmonious relationship between corporations, corporate managers, and
society.197 At the 1956 meeting of the American Economic Association,
economist Carl Kaysen noted that “[t]he modern corporation is a soulful
corporation”198:
No longer the agent of proprietorship seeking to maximize
return on investment, management sees itself as responsible
to stockholders, employees, customers, the general public,
and, perhaps most important, the firm itself as an institution.
. . . [Moreover, its] responsibilities to the general public are
widespread: leadership in local charitable enterprises,
concern with factory architecture and landscaping, provision
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of support for higher education, and even research in pure
science, to name a few.199
Business leaders were quick to pronounce their commitment to fulfilling
their managerial role. In 1927, Owen Young told his audience that managers
had a special obligation to serve the public interest.200 In the postwar years,
managers saw themselves as the “neutral, honest brokers in distributional
battles among the firm’s various contractual stakeholders” and viewed
corporate internal hierarchies as “sustain[ing] their neutrality and ensur[ing]
their expertise.”201 The Harvard Business School’s alumni association
proclaimed that management acted as trustees to the “employees, investors,
consumers, and government,” while Fortune magazine reported that managers
were “conducting the ‘affairs of the enterprise in such a way as to maintain an
equitable and working balance among the claims of the various directly interested
groups—stockholders, employees, customers, and the public at large.’”202
State courts fully embraced the managerial class as the promoter of
socially beneficial goals. The scholarly obsession with democracy, mentioned
above, not only helped legitimate the large publicly held corporation; it also
helped secure the position of corporate management. For one thing, courts
rejected the idea of direct shareholder participation in corporate affairs, and in
its place embraced an ideal of representative democracy.203 Shareholders were
expected to elect directors, who would choose managers to “execute the
general policies laid down by the directors.”204 However, shareholders could
not order or command the directors or managers. So that corporations could
continue to play their social role, management’s discretion, including its
prerogative to determine the corporation’s social responsibilities, could not be
limited by reference to the shareholders’ wishes (or objections).205
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Id. at 313.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
Ernie Englander & Allen Kaufman, The End of Managerial Ideology: From Corporate Social
Responsibility to Corporate Social Indifference, 5 ENTERPRISE & SOC. 404, 410 (2004).
Harwell Wells, “Corporation Law is Dead”: Heroic Managerialism, Legal Change, and the Puzzle of
Corporation Law at the Height of the American Century, 15 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 328 (2013)
(emphasis added).
See Mitchell, supra note 131, at 113–14.
Thomas F. Woodlock, Careless Owners: How Shall the Supreme Inertia of the American
Stockholder Be Overcome?, WALL ST. J., April 22, 1931, at 1.
Mitchell, supra note 131, at 113–14; see also Mark S. Mizruchi, Berle and Means Revisited: The
Governance and Power of Large U.S. Corporations, 33 THEORY & SOC. 579, 583 (2004) (stating
that “the pursuit of profit was deemed no longer necessary, as great size, market power,
and . . . disorganized stockholders allowed corporate managers to pursue goals other than
profits . . .”).
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As Gerald Frug explained, managers were seen as the shareholders’
representatives who, while “not amenable to direct shareholder control,
nevertheless serve[d] shareholder interests.”206 The “shareholder interest” was
not determined by reference to shareholders’ subjective, and potentially
conflicting, desires; rather, it was an “objectified abstraction,” determined by
the fiduciaries, “the bureaucratic managers,” and “attributed to all
shareholders of all corporations whether they want it or not.”207 Fears about
potential abuse of power by management dissipated. Management had full
discretion to determine the “shareholder interest” while “shareholder
interest” presumably constrained management’s power. By relying on this
circularity of power and restraint, courts helped legitimate corporate and
management power in the second part of the twentieth century.208
With this understanding of the appropriate roles for shareholders and
managers, the courts stopped using the ultra vires doctrine to analyze cases
involving the exercise of corporate power to achieve goals other than profit
maximization for the shareholders. Accepting, as A. P. Smith did, that
corporate power included the power to engage in actions that were beneficial
to society,209 the courts examined only whether, in exercising their power,
corporate managers fulfilled their fiduciary obligations. In so doing, the courts
ensured that decisions regarding corporate purpose would fall under the
protective presumption of the business judgment rule.
Take, for example, Shlensky v. Wrigley, a derivative suit brought by a
minority stockholder of the Chicago National League Ball Club, Inc. (a
Delaware corporation that owned and operated the Chicago Cubs) against the
corporation’s directors as well as its controlling shareholder and president,
Philip K. Wrigley.210 The plaintiff claimed that the Chicago Cubs were
suffering losses, in part, because the directors had consistently refused to
install lights at Wrigley Field and schedule night baseball games.211 (Wrigley
Field, the Cubs’ home park, was also owned by the corporation.) As the
plaintiff saw it:
Wrigley has refused to install lights, not because of interest
in the welfare of the corporation but because of his personal
opinions “that baseball is a ‘daytime sport’ and that the
206
207
208
209
210
211

Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1307
(1984).
Id. at 1307–08.
Id. at 1309.
See discussion supra Part II.A.
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill App. Ct. 1968).
Id. at 777–78.
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installation of lights and night baseball games will have a
deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood.”212
The Illinois Supreme Court saw matters differently. Referencing Dodge,
upon which the plaintiff relied, the court concluded that it was “not satisfied
that the motives assigned to Philip K. Wrigley, and through him to the other
directors, are contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the
stockholders.”213 The issue was simply one of business judgment, and the
court would not intervene without a show of “fraud, illegality or conflict of
interest.”214
With respect to charitable contributions, the shift toward business
judgment began with the Chancery Court of Delaware’s decision in Theodora
Holding Company v. Henderson.215 The case involved a corporation seeking to
make a gift of about two percent of its total income to a charitable trust
“authorized to operate exclusively in the fields of ‘religious, charitable,
scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals.’”216 Despite the fact that the trust was controlled by the
controlling shareholder (and director) of the contributing corporation, the
court declared it to be valid because it was reasonable.217 Vice-Chancellor
Marvel stated that “the test to be applied in passing on the validity of a gift
such as the one here in issue is that of reasonableness, a test in which the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code pertaining to charitable gifts by
corporations furnish a helpful guide.”218
Beyond reasonableness, the decision to allow corporate management to
pursue such charitable contributions was grounded in the court’s
understanding of the law of corporate purpose. As Vice-Chancellor Marvel
put it:
It is . . . obvious, in my opinion, that the relatively small loss
of immediate income otherwise payable to . . . the corporate
defendant’s . . . stockholders, had it not been for the gift in
question, is far out-weighed by the overall benefits flowing
from the placing of such gift in channels where it serves to
benefit those in need of philanthropic or educational
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Id. at 778.
Id. at 779–80.
Id. at 780.
Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398, 404–05 (Del. Ch.1969).
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 405.
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support, thus providing justification for large private
holdings, thereby benefiting plaintiff in the long run.219
Of particular importance, according to Marvel, was the fact that the
charitable foundation that received the contribution was working “towards
the rehabilitation and education of deprived but deserving young people.”220
Such work, Marvel noted, was “peculiarly appropriate in an age when a large
segment of youth is alienated even from parents who are not entirely satisfied
with our present social and economic system.”221
In 1971, reviewing Shlensky and Theodora among other cases, Carroll
Wetzel and James Winokur concluded that management was free to pursue
social goals, reaching further than charitable contributions. As they noted:
[T]o the extent that corporate executives wish, for example,
to meet social responsibilities by extra recruitment in
minority communities, or development of safer, less
polluting manufacturing techniques and final products, such
decisions will probably enjoy the same judicial sympathy as
have corporate gifts. This is not to say that the profit motive
has been expunged from the law books but that, if history is
any guide, the courts can be expected to take a broad and
sympathetic view of new efforts by corporate managers to
solve new problems.222
Wetzel and Winokur’s analysis reached further. Recognizing the growing
trend in state courts (especially in Delaware) to uphold decisions of corporate
managers,223 they noted that “to the extent that corporate managers are
responsive to the needs of the time as those needs become apparent, the
‘business judgment’ rule will grow in corresponding vigor for their
protection.”224 When, in Kahn v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court of Delaware
finally found an opportunity to opine on the matter, it too embraced the

219
220
221
222

223
224

Id.
Id.
Id.
Wetzel & Winokur, supra note 154, at 241; see also Friedmann, supra note 178, at 162
(noting that “[w]hether we attribute it to an increased sense of social responsibility, to a
good sense of public relations, or even just to an enlightened consideration of the future
needs of the corporations themselves, the fact is that the giant industrial corporations of
today can no longer afford to put their profits entirely into dividends or increased
salaries”) (footnote omitted).
Wetzel & Winokur, supra note 154, at 241.
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reasonableness test, adding that the business judgment rule would likely
protect a board’s decision to make a charitable contribution.225
As the following part explores, by the time Kahn was decided, several
forces had already converged diametrically to alter the midcentury
understanding of corporate purpose. Rising numbers of shareholders,
increasing demands on corporations to act in socially responsible ways, and
growing criticisms of the ideology of managerialism coupled with a fresh
interest in the role of the board of directors changed the contours of
corporate law. Yet, perhaps the most significant development affecting the
law of corporate purpose was the rising number of hostile takeovers during
the 1980s. Amidst mounting calls for imposing social duties on corporations,
the hostile takeovers helped focus corporate law on the maximization of
profit for the shareholders. Still, as Kahn itself illustrates, the rhetoric of
wealth maximization was typically used not to enrich the shareholders but to
empower corporate managers to determine their corporation’s ends without
limitation or interference by the courts.
III. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND THE SHAREHOLDER WEALTH
MAXIMIZATION NORM, 1970S TO 2000S
A. Changing Tides
Through the 1950s, stock ownership was not widespread—less than 5%
of the population owned stock—and corporations relied upon earnings and,
to a more limited extent, external financing from banks to fund their
operations.226 Trading volume was also low, indicating that these shareholders
preferred long-term investment for appreciation and income.227 In 1954,
riding the waves of “patriotism and renewed appreciation of capitalism” that
characterized the 1950s, the NYSE embarked upon a campaign for mass
225
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Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48 (Del. 1991) (approving a settlement of a shareholders’
challenge to a donation of millions of dollars made by the Occidental Petroleum
Corporation to the Armand Hammer Museum of Art and Cultural Center, which housed
the art collection of Occidental’s chief executive officer and chairman of the board,
Armand Hammer).
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: The Empirical Evidence 12–
15
(Oct.
30,
2008)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292403. As Mitchell notes,
“external financing in general only began to grow from the turn of the twentieth century
on, but almost all of that growth was in various forms of debt.” Id. at 7 (footnote
omitted).
HO, supra note 20, at 200–01.
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marketing stock as a means, among others, to fight communism, socialism
and fascism.228 As NYSE President G. Keith Funston explained:
We have learned that capitalism functions best when
ownership of the means of production is not confined to the
wealthy few but is spread through the land. The idea of
public ownership of industry is not an endorsement of
socialism or nationalization but the hope that all the
people—factory workers, housewives, farmers, lawyers—can
own a share in a business enterprise. That is democratic
capitalism. It is our job to help make it work.229
Titled “Own Your Share of American Business,” the campaign used
sophisticated advertising tools that did not focus on political ideologies but
rather on associating investment in stock with steady income, gradually
“transforming many citizens’ image of equity investing from a sinful, foolish
pursuit akin to gambling to a wholesome activity as quintessentially American
as . . . apple pie.”230 The bullish market growth in the succeeding decade
confirmed the success of the NYSE’s campaign.231
The development of modern finance theory coincided with the NYSE
efforts. In the first part of the twentieth century, as corporations sought to
create a market for their stock, economists justified investment by reference
to the intrinsic value of corporations. Beginning in the 1950s, however, the
newly developed modern portfolio theory suggested that investors could
create “an efficient portfolio,” that is, a portfolio that would achieve
maximum return by diversifying non-systematic risk, and that the portfolio,
rather
than
individual
corporations,
should be the
focus
of investment analysis.232 The Capital Asset Pricing Model, which was
developed in the 1960s, offered a regression analysis of a stock’s historical
movement in relation to the market to help investors diversify even the
systematic risk inherent in the market. Rather than study the fundamentals of
companies in which they were interested, investors were advised to study the
historical performance of their companies’ stock price.233 As Ronald Gilson
228
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Janice Traflet, “Own Your Share of American Business”: Public Relations at the NYSE During the
Cold
War,
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&
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1,
3–4
(2003),
http://www.thebhc.org/sites/default/files/Traflet_0.pdf.
Id. at 4 (citation omitted).
Id. at 20–21.
Id.
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Morals of the Marketplace: A Cautionary Essay for Our Time, 20
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 171, 176–78 (2009).
See id. at 178–79; Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC.
342, 345 (2005).
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and Jeffrey Gordon have demonstrated, the need to ensure ample
diversification of both systematic and non-systematic risks led investors to
choose mutual funds over direct investment in corporate stock; within a few
decades, the percentage of households that owned equities through mutual
funds dramatically increased.234
The bull market through the late 1960s helped keep the growing numbers
of investors satisfied. In the 1970s, however, for the first time since the early
New Deal, the publicly held corporation came under “searching public
scrutiny” with “widespread complaint that corporations have become cavalier
about consumer interests . . . largely indifferent to social deterioration around
them, and . . . dangerous polluters of the environment.”235 Demands on
corporations to fulfill social and political goals widely intensified.
Corporations were expected to help eliminate poverty, provide health care,
promote ethnic and racial equality, offer educational opportunities, ensure
safer products and safer work places, and protect the environment, even if
such actions lowered profits.236 When inflation and “unfavorable balance of
trade” affected the nation, corporations were called upon to adopt “voluntary
restraints on prices, on imports of goods and on the export of capital.”237
The new investors, especially the growing number of institutional
investors, found a new role. Public interest shareholder groups used the
SEC’s proxy and shareholder proposal rules to address corporate practices
related to the Vietnam War, environmental protection, occupational safety,
and equal employment.238 The Project on Corporate Responsibility (the
“Project”), which owned twelve shares of stock of General Motors (“GM”),
234
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Ronald Gilson and Jeffrey Gordon note that, while the percentage of
households that directly own equities has remained about 20% since the late 1970s,
mutual funds investment (including but not limited to retirement investment) “has
increased the percentage of households that own equities directly or through mutual
funds by 30% to a total of 50%” by the middle of the first decade of the twentyfirst century. Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism:
Activist Investors and the Reevaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863, 884
(2013). Moreover, while in the 1950s, “[e]quities were still held predominantly by
households” with institutional investors holding “only approximately 6.1% of U.S.
equities,” by the 1980s, “institutional investors held 28.4% of U.S. equities.” Id. at 874. By
the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, “institutional investors held 50.6%
of all U.S. public equities, and 73% of the equity of the thousand largest U.S.
corporations.” Id.
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 14
(1971).
See id. at 13; see also EICHAR, supra note 33, at 243.
Manne, supra note 176, at 2.
Joel Seligman, A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate
Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 328 (1987).
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was the first among many such attempts.239 The Project was formed by four
lawyers, who, with Ralph Nader’s support, asked GM’s management to
include nine proposals in the company’s proxy solicitation.240 These proposals
addressed product quality and safety, working conditions, environmental
protection, and affirmative action.241 Other organizations followed the
Project’s example. Church groups and institutional investors mounted
campaigns to ensure equal employment opportunities, stop plant closing,
prevent environmental pollution, and divest from “countries with
controversial human rights records, energy conservation, nuclear power and
nuclear weapons.”242 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC),
which was established in 1972 by a group of institutional investors who were
trying to assess how to vote on these new resolutions, “counted 38 social
responsibility resolutions coming to votes in 1973, 72 in 1974, 83 in 1975 and
133 in 1976.”243
The demands on corporations and their management were many, but
their unifying theme was simple and familiar. The corporation was seen as
affecting different segments of society, not only its investors. Its power was
deemed public rather than private. Social, cultural and economic groups
affected by the corporation wanted a say in its direction.244 According to
proponents of corporate social responsibility, so that the corporation could
maintain its legitimacy in American society, “the social and economic groups
affected by the corporation” had to “participate in the corporate decisionmaking process.”245
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Phillip A. Nicholas, Jr., The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Shareholder
Proposal Rule: Agency, Administration, Corporate Influence, and Shareholder Power,
1942–1988, at 281, 295 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, State University of New
York at Albany) (on file with Dissertations & Theses Global).
Id. at 285.
Id. at 286–88, 304. The Project was able to bring two of the proposals before the
shareholders: one seeking an increase in the size of the board, and the other seeking to
“improve the company’s social impact” by creating a “General Motors Shareholders
Committee for Corporate Responsibility,” “comprised of . . . persons appointed by
General Motors, the United Auto Workers, and Campaign GM.” Id. Although neither
proposal gained sufficient votes (not even the 3% required for reintroduction on the
proxy in subsequent years), their inclusion in the company’s proxy constituted a major
victory for advocates of social cause proposals. Id. at 288–90.
LAUREN TALNER, THE ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 47 (1983).
HELEN E. BOOTH, THE SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL RULE: SEC INTERPRETATIONS AND
LAWSUITS 3 (1987).
Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Social Responsibility Panel: The Constituencies of the Corporation and
the Role of the Institutional Investor, 28 BUS. L. 177, 179 (1973).
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In 1971, a report by the Committee for Economic Development pointed
out that, in the first half of the twentieth century, workers, consumers and
investors were seen as the corporations’ constituencies.246 Corporations could
thus meet their perceived social responsibilities simply by “generating . . .
economic growth,”247 which led to “increasing employment, rising wages and
salaries, employee benefits plans, and expanding career opportunities” and
contributed to “the rising standard of living of the average American
family.”248 For the most part, generating growth did not conflict with the
business goal of making profit. As the report further noted, the “profit-andloss discipline” led corporations to “improve goods and services, to reduce
costs, and to attract more customers.”249 Profits also allowed corporations to
“contribute importantly—through taxes and donations—to the financial
support of public and private organizations working to improve the quality of
life.”250
By the 1970s, however, the number of perceived corporate constituencies
expanded to include not only investors, consumers, and workers, but also
“suppliers, the community, and perhaps even the larger society, governments,
and future generations.”251 The demands on corporations dramatically
increased. As the Committee for Economic Development report noted:
[T]he expectations of American society have now begun to
rise at a faster pace than the nation’s economic and social
performance. Concentrated attention is being focused on the
ill-being of sectors of the population and on ways to bring
them up to the general well-being of most of the citizenry.
Fundamental changes are also taking place in attitudes, with
greater emphasis being put on human values—on individual
worth and the qualitative aspects of life and community
affairs.252
With growing and diverse demands on corporations, the ideology of
managerialism itself came under direct attack. For one thing, studies indicated
that management-controlled firms were just as profitable as owner-controlled
firms.253 Corporate managements were also seen as responsible, at least in
246
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See COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 235, at 11–12.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
Id. at 12.
Id.; see also Howard F. Sohn, Prevailing Rationales in the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate, 1
J. BUS. ETHICS 139, 139–41 (1982).
Sohn, supra note 250, at 140–41.
COMM. FOR ECON. DEV., supra note 235, at 12.
Mizruchi, supra note 205, at 585–86.
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part, for the “economic distress” that characterized the 1970s.254 “[E]xternal
economic shocks, compounded by a drop in productivity growth, cost-ofliving adjustments built into union contracts, and an economy shifting toward
services” led to dramatic wage and profitability drop.255 Industrial
corporations began a rapid “drift from the center toward the periphery of the
economy,” and were replaced by newcomers from the technology and service
sectors.256 Americans lost faith in their federal and state governments as well
as in industrial corporations and their ability to improve the economy.257
Seeking to understand and address the weaknesses of managerialism,
corporate law scholars and policymakers turned to the independent directors
to actively monitor corporate managers.258 The independent directors became
the epicenter of the monitoring model of the board that was endorsed by the
business and legal communities as well as the Delaware courts.259 It described
directors as responsible for monitoring top executives and recommended that
boards include a significant number of outside, independent directors.260 Yet,
while progressive scholars sought to use the monitoring model of the board
to impose duties on directors toward corporate constituencies other than the
shareholders, the Delaware courts embraced a different vision, using the
independent directors to justify Delaware’s embrace of the narrow goal of
shareholder wealth maximization as corporate law’s purpose.261
How could the Delaware courts be so oblivious to the demands of the
community, especially given the prominence of such demands in the 1970s?
One might suggest that the Delaware courts found the expanding concept of
social responsibility difficult to address and feared that directors and
executives simply would not be able to meet all the demands that the
proposals discussed above made.262 The following section offers a different
254
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RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF
MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 297 (2007).
Id. at 297–98.
Id. at 298 (citation omitted).
Id. at 298–99.
Mitchell, supra note 131, at 132, 136.
Id. at 132–40.
Id. at 132–38.
Id. at 137–38; see also Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States,
1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1510–27
(2007) (examining the interdependence of the rise of independent directors and the ascent
of the shareholder wealth maximization norm).
See Thomas J. Zenisek, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Conceptualization Based on
Organizational Literature, 4 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 359 (1979) (arguing that corporate social
responsibility is difficult to define).
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reason. It explores how the shareholder value maximization became the
Delaware courts’ response to the takeover movement of the 1980s. Described
by Wall Street investment bankers as a natural response to inefficient
conglomerates (and the managers who ran them), the takeover movement
was seen by the Delaware courts as a threat to corporations and society, not
unlike the threats of socialism in the early twentieth century or communism in
the midcentury. In earlier decades the courts drew upon progressive and
democratic ideologies to offer a purpose for corporations and corporate law
so as to withstand the threats of socialism and communism. In the 1980s, the
courts turned to shareholder wealth maximization to weather the threat of
hostile takeovers. Just as Wall Street embraced this norm as a justification for
hostile takeovers, the Delaware courts used it to empower corporate
managers and directors to defend against unwanted bids. In so doing, the
courts made shareholder wealth maximization the ultimate corporate
purpose.263
B. Economics and the Ethics of the Market Place
In 1959, political theorist Robert Dahl commented that in the postwar
years, political scientists, while remaining interested in “the relatively well
established field of government regulation in the broad sense,” had left the
study of the internal order of the corporation to economists.264 As I elaborate
below, in so doing, political theorists opened a door for the removal of
“questions of power, influence, sanctions, [and] legitimacy” that is, questions
of government and political order—from the study of the firm.265
Neoclassical economics stepped in to fill the gap. Until the 1960s,
neoclassical economists focused their attention on pricing and paid little
attention to the organization of industry. Then, in a series of works, beginning
with Ronald Coase’s Nobel prize winning The Problem of Social Cost,266
economists brought market analysis to bear upon the theory of the firm. The
Problem of Social Cost emphasized the benefits of markets, arguing that, so long
as transaction costs were zero (or minimal), individuals would enter
263
264
265

266

On Wall Street’s embrace of the shareholder value maximizing norm, see HO, supra note
20, at 122–212.
Robert A. Dahl, Business and Politics: A Critical Appraisal of Political Science, 53 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1, 1–3 (1959).
Id. at 3; see also Dalia T. Mitchell, From Pluralism to Individualism: Berle and Means and 20thCentury American Legal Thought, 30 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 179 (2005) (explaining political
scientists’ focus on corporate power in the early decades of the twentieth century and
neoclassical economists’ fixation with the market in the second half of the century).
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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“transaction creating markets” both to avoid the costs of inefficient
hierarchies and to “fill the vacuum left by the absence of preexisting market
or command relationships.”267 Questions of welfare economics were left for
philosophical discussions, and the science of economics became fixated upon
the problem of transaction costs.268
Economists and lawyers associated with the burgeoning law and
economics movement welcomed The Problem of Social Cost, linking it with their
own growing faith in the power of economic markets to produce the
common good.269 Their new economic theory of the firm offered a picture of
the corporation that fit the market-centered economic policies of the postwar
years.270 Rather than putting management hierarchies and the need to
constrain corporate power at the center of the corporate paradigm, the new
economic theory of the firm found a way around hierarchy and regulation by
drawing on microeconomics to describe corporate entities as nexuses of
private, contractual relationships. The corporation was a collection of
“disaggregated but interrelated transactions” among individuals or the
convenient fiction of corporate entity in free and efficient markets.271
Investors, managers, workers, and all other corporate constituencies were
presumed to be self-interested wealth-maximizers operating in formally free
markets. Concerns about managerial expertise were translated into questions
about economic efficiency, and managers described corporate activities in the
social sphere as “the pursuit of profit.”272 Public problems such as
267
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inflation,” “the worst recession since the 1930s,” and multiple proposals for economic
planning at the state and federal levels, by the early 1980s, U.S. economic policy heavily
relied on market allocation of resources).
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CORNELL L. REV. 407, 416–20 (1989); Bratton, supra note 181, at 1498; Oliver E.
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351, 365 (1983).
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discrimination and growing disparities of wealth were depicted as providing
industries with “opportunities for growth and profit.”273 The corporation was
a means of achieving both; other goals were allowed only if incidental to
profit and growth.
As to the managers and directors’ accountability—law and economics
scholars put their trust in the disciplinary power of the market for control.
But such trust also ensured that corporate purpose would be evaluated merely
by reference to profitability. Pursuing any other end, Henry Manne explained
in 1972, would be devastating to corporations.274 Since shareholders expect
profit, they would treat “any corporate expenditure that reduces their wealth
position with disfavor regardless of the purpose for which the expenditure
was made.”275 Stock price will adjust accordingly, making the corporation
more susceptible to discipline by the market for control. As Manne explained,
“[i]n such companies the incentive to purchase control will be measured by
the difference between the current price of shares and the price that can be
anticipated with more efficient or less ‘charitable’ managers.”276
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 helped turn this market rhetoric
into a political and economic reality. Reagan’s policies of deregulation helped
create “the active market for corporate control” that Manne and other law
and economics scholars celebrated.277 According to one report, “of the 150
largest public corporations in the United States in 1980, 22 percent had been
merged with or acquired by other public companies by 1988, while another 5
percent had been taken private.”278
In her ethnography of Wall Street, Karen Ho has explained how, at the
time, investment bankers defended the takeover movement by retelling the
postwar history of the publicly held corporation as a narrative about “selfserving managerial class” that “squandered corporate resources extravagantly
on themselves . . . and allowed foreign competitors to overtake the United
States in productivity, innovation, and strategy.”279 Amidst the Reagan
administration’s “dismantling of antitrust enforcement,” the conglomerates of
the 1960s were seen as the prime example of managerial self-interest—a “fad”
that was described as hindering corporate America’s competitiveness in global
273
274
275
276
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markets.280 Accordingly, a primary goal of the takeover movement was
“‘unlocking’ the value of ‘underperforming’ stock prices” to the benefit of the
victims in this narrative—the shareholders.281
In a very short time, Wall Street investment bankers, focused on
increasing the value of their portfolios, and institutional investors, keen on
achieving the same, were able to use the hostile takeovers of the 1980s to
force corporations:
to choose between shareholder value and other alternatives
of corporate governance . . . By putting corporations “in
play,” proponents of shareholder value created a historically
unprecedented environment where all the largest
corporations were up for grabs to the highest stock-price
bidder, thus forcing them to be immediately responsive to
the exigencies of the stock market.282
Corporations began using their retained earnings and debt to return value
to shareholders, defend against hostile tender offers, and finance successful
takeovers.283 “‘[L]oyalty to workers, products, corporate structures,
businesses, factories, communities, [and] even the nation’ . . . [were] viewed as
expendable.”284 Institutional investors, investment bankers, and hostile
bidders replaced corporate managers as custodians of corporate policy.285
Stock price was rapidly becoming the medium for evaluating corporate
performance and the ultimate corporate goal. Indeed, as I elaborate below,
when the Supreme Court of Delaware was called upon to evaluate these
changes and the potential threat they posed to corporations and society, it,
too, ended up endorsing the rhetoric of stock price maximization.
Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the seminal takeover case to reach
the Supreme Court of Delaware, involved an attempt by Mesa Petroleum
Corporation to gain control of Unocal Corporation, most likely in the hopes
of being paid (by Unocal) to stop its takeover bid.286 Mesa’s tender offer
provided the shareholders of Unocal with a premium over the market price of
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their shares, but Unocal directors determined that the offer was inadequate.287
Assessing whether or not the directors could adopt measures to defend
against Mesa’s hostile bid, the court concluded that “the board’s power to act
derives from its fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate
enterprise, which includes stockholders, from harm reasonably perceived,
irrespective of its source.”288 While Unocal’s directors only pointed to the fact
that the price Mesa offered was inadequate and thus potentially harmful to
the shareholders, the court added that, in deciding whether or not to adopt a
defensive measure, the board could evaluate “the impact [of the takeover bid]
on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”289
As the above quote suggests, Unocal seemed to have embraced a
corporate purpose that reached beyond the maximization of profit for the
shareholders, at least in the context of hostile takeovers. Recognizing that the
takeover movement could destroy corporations and damage the economy, the
Supreme Court of Delaware wanted to empower corporate managers to
defend against them, even if the Delaware General Corporation Law did not
explicitly authorize them to do so.
Yet, the Court was also keen on assuring investors, bankers and lawyers,
that shareholders’ interests were sufficiently protected under Delaware law.
Less than a year after Unocal, in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., the Court endorsed the norm of shareholder wealth maximization used
by hostile bidders, asserting:
[W]e address for the first time the extent to which a
corporation may consider the impact of a takeover threat on
constituencies other than shareholders. . . . [W]hile concern
for various corporate constituencies is proper when
addressing a takeover threat, that principle is limited by the
requirement that there be some rationally related benefit
accruing to the stockholders.290
Jurists have debated the significance of Revlon to the law of corporate
purpose.291 Whether or not Revlon supports the proposition that, even outside
287
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the takeovers and acquisitions context, directors must focus only on the
interests of the shareholders, other cases, especially those dealing with other
financial constituencies, favored the limited purpose of maximizing value for
the shareholders.
For example, in Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., as part of a planned
restructuring and recapitalization negotiated with Allied-Signal, Oak
Industries, a company “in deep trouble,” extended cash and common stock
exchange offers to its six classes of long-term debt securities.292 Tendering
noteholders had to “consent to amendments in the indentures governing the
securities,” amendments that would remove “significant negotiated
protections to holders of the Company’s long-term debt including the
deletion of all financial covenants.”293 These modifications would affect
noteholders who chose not to tender into the exchange offers, but not those
who tendered and received cash or stock.294 Failure to obtain the required
consents from the noteholders would have allowed Allied-Signal to decline to
complete the planned acquisition.295 An owner of long-term debt securities
sought to enjoin consummation of Oak Industries’ exchange offers.296
Acknowledging that the “purpose and effect” of Oak Industries’
exchange offers were to “benefit Oak’s common stockholders at the expense
of the holders of its debt,” Chancellor Allen did not find the plaintiff’s claims
to “allege any cognizable wrong.”297 As Allen put it, “[i]t is the obligation of
directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run interests of the
corporation’s stockholders.”298 If they do so “at the expense” of others, here
the debt holders, it “does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty.”299
Reducing the plaintiff’s rights to contractual rather than fiduciary claims,
Allen held that Oak Industries did not breach the implied covenant of good
faith in its dealing with its debt holders.300
Two years later, in Simons v. Cogan, the Supreme Court of Delaware
similarly treated an attempt by a holder of convertible subordinated
debentures to hold directors liable for breach of fiduciary duties associated
with a cash-out merger.301 Declining to extend the fiduciary obligations of
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corporate management to holders of convertible debentures, Justice Walsh
reasoned: “A debenture is a credit instrument which does not devolve upon
its holder an equity interest in the issuing corporation.”302 A convertible
debenture was not different, representing “a contractual entitlement to the
repayment of a debt and . . . not . . . an equitable interest in the issuing
corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with
concomitant fiduciary duties.”303 To trigger a fiduciary duty, Walsh concluded,
“an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a duty must
exist.”304
Even preferences and limitations associated with preferred stock were
deemed contractual. In Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., Chancellor Allen
held that “with respect to matters relating to preferences or limitations that
distinguish preferred stock from common, the duty of the corporation and its
directors is essentially contractual and the scope of the duty is appropriately
defined by reference to the specific words evidencing that contract.”305 More
recently, in In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation, which addressed potential
conflicting interests between the common and preferred stock during a
merger, Vice Chancellor Laster made clear the implications of characterizing
certain rights of the preferred stock as contractual.306 Directors, Laster
reiterated, are required to “strive in good faith and on an informed basis to
maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants,
the ultimate beneficiaries of the firm’s value, not for the benefit of its
contractual claimants.”307
Why did the Delaware courts, faced with the threats of hostile takeovers,
adopt the rhetoric of shareholder wealth maximization, which investment
bankers used to promote such transactions? Just as courts earlier in the
twentieth century turned to corporate purpose to empower management, so
did the Delaware courts in the 1980s. The courts’ refusal to extend fiduciary
obligations to holders of debt securities, convertible debt, and preferred stock
not only indicated that these constituencies would have to find ways
contractually to protect their interests, but it also assured shareholders that
corporations were run for their benefit. More importantly, it provided
corporate managers with a tool, both practical and rhetorical, with which to
thwart challenges to their power (including the threat of hostile takeovers).
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Like courts throughout the twentieth century, the Delaware courts in the
1980s offered managers a corporate purpose with which they could justify
their actions; so long as corporate managers explained their decisions as
maximizing wealth for their shareholders, the Delaware courts were not likely
to intervene or evaluate their actions. Subsumed under the doctrine of
fiduciary obligations, the maximization of profit for the shareholders became
corporate law’s single purpose.308
Directors were no longer entrusted with the task of making business
decisions with the community—or even the corporation’s other
constituencies—in mind. Rather, they were responsible for maximizing value
for their shareholders, irrespective of the potential harm to other
constituencies and the corporation as a whole. In turn, shareholders learned
not only to expect but also to demand appreciation on their stock price.309 As
the Introduction to this article explored, two decades after the wave of hostile
takeovers led the Delaware courts to endorse the shareholder wealth
maximization norm, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. brought suit suggesting
that Craiglist could not pursue its corporate purpose at the expense of
maximizing profit for its shareholders, including eBay.310
EPILOGUE
Corporate America has changed dramatically since the 1980s—the
number of hostile takeovers subsided considerably after the Delaware courts
allowed managements to adopt measures such as poison pills to defend
against hostile bids and effectively foil the market for control. The Enron and
WorldCom scandals in the early 2000s and the financial crisis of 2008
illustrated, among other things, the dangers associated with the exclusive
pursuit of stock price maximization.
In 2005, a survey of senior financial officers of the 400 largest U.S.
corporations revealed that close to eighty percent would sacrifice a firm’s
long-term economic value to meet analysts’ quarterly earnings expectations.311
On the other hand, in 2016, a survey of 275 CEOs revealed the importance
308
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they ascribe to corporate purpose (and not merely maximization of
shareholder wealth).312 At least ninety percent of the CEOs indicated that
“their company has a clearly stated and defined purpose,” and that such
purpose helped shape “both their strategic framework and their corporate
culture.”313 Sixty three percent of the CEOs indicated that having and
“emphasizing purpose within their business” not only “contributed positively
to revenue growth” but also “help[ed] build better employee engagement,
brand reputation and customer loyalty, as well as attracting new business
partners.”314 At the same time, a majority of the CEOs admitted that it was
difficult to translate purpose “into action, operations and business as
usual.”315
In February 2017, the Washington Post reported that in recent years,
American corporations have become “a force for social change,”316 eagerly
jumping into the social and political arena to advocate causes such as gay
rights, racial equality and, more recently, opposition to President Trump.317
“Business leaders have taken political stances in the past,” Jena McGregor
and Elizabeth Dwoskin wrote, “but usually behind the scenes.”318 With
growing pressures from consumers and employees, as well as the easily
accessible social media, speaking out about American politics, culture, and
society is rapidly becoming the norm for corporate America.319
Despite these changes, and despite recent decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court that suggest that at least closely held corporations could
pursue ends other than profit maximization,320 the Delaware courts have
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remained unyielding in their apparent commitment to shareholder wealth
maximization as the only corporate purpose. In different essays on the subject
Chief Justice Strine has not only stressed Delaware corporate law’s
commitment to profit maximization but also cautioned scholars arguing for
broader corporate purpose, stating that “the continued failure . . . to be cleareyed about the role of the for-profit corporation endangers the public
interest.”321 According to Strine, by ignoring the realities of for-profit
corporations and assuming that “they are moral beings capable of being
‘better’ in the long-run than the lowest common denominator,” scholars and
jurists neglect to push for much needed regulatory change.322
Yet, while committed to the rhetoric of shareholder wealth
maximization, the Delaware courts have, for the most part, focused on
empowering managers, not on ensuring that shareholders profit. If Wall
Street investment bankers in the 1980s fought for shareholder wealth
maximization to rein in corporate managers and ensure the profitability of
their portfolios, the Delaware courts embraced the norm as a means of
ensuring that corporate managers remained in control. Take, for example,
eBay Domestic Holding, Inc. v. Newmark, the case with which this article began.
Chancellor Chandler’s decision in eBay prevented Craigslist from diluting
eBay’s 28.4% ownership stake. At the same time, however, Chandler allowed
Craigslist to institute a staggered board that prevented eBay from ever gaining
control of Craigslist. As Chandler explained, “[b]y challenging the Staggered
Board Amendments . . . eBay . . . seeks to obtain a benefit it was not able to
obtain under the Shareholders’ Agreement. In trying to undo the staggered
board, and thereby protect its mathematical ability to fill a board seat, eBay is
doing exactly what it accuses Jim and Craig of doing.”323 Without a seat on
the board, eBay, despite its 28.4% stake, did not have the “knowledge of and
the ability to influence Craigslist’s strategic decisions.”324 Five years after it
presumably won its corporate purpose argument, eBay gave in. On June 19,
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2015, eBay confirmed that “it sold its 28.4 percent stake in Craigslist back to
the San Francisco-based online classified company,” indicating that “the deal
also came with an agreement that all litigation between the companies will be
dismissed.”325
In the end, the discourse of corporate purpose cannot be separated
from the history of corporate power, specifically the power of corporate
management. While the law of corporate purpose shifted from channeling
corporate power and the power of those in control in the early twentieth
century to promoting American democracy in the midcentury years to
maximizing value for the shareholders at the century’s end, throughout the
twentieth century, cases addressing the question of purpose, including the
ones discussed in this article, have almost always upheld the decisions of
corporate managers. Within a few years of Milton Friedman’s famous
equation of corporate social responsibility with the maximization of profit,
J.A.C. Hetherington commented:
[I]t is questionable whether the affirmative duty to maximize
profits can be effectively enforced because of the practical
impossibility of defining precise standards to measure
degrees of adequacy of managerial performance where no
self-dealing or negligence is involved . . . . In effect,
therefore, only the prohibitory aspects of fiduciary
responsibility lend themselves to judicial enforcement; the
affirmative mandate to maximize profits to benefit the
owners is policed only by management itself or through
outside institutions, such as the stock market.326
Once the courts have begun to examine the corporation’s purpose as an
aspect of directors’ and managers’ fiduciary obligations, the presumption of
the business judgment rule has guaranteed that the shareholders would not be
able to force directors to fulfill the goal of wealth maximization. As Stephen
Bainbridge writes, “the business judgment rule effectively precludes courts
from reviewing corporate decisions that allegedly further interests other than
that of shareholder wealth maximization.”327 The very few exceptions—
perhaps Dodge, maybe Revlon or eBay—are interesting cases but they do not, in
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fact they cannot, alter the rule, that is, the business judgment rule. Under
Delaware corporate law, decisions about a corporation’s purpose, like any
other business matter, are in the discretion of corporate directors and
executives. The latter have defined and will continue to define the role and
purpose of corporations in our society.328
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On August 19, 2019, the Business Roundtable issued a new “Statement on the Purpose of
a Corporation.” Our Commitment, BUSINESS
ROUNDTABLE, https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/ourcommitment/ (last
visited Sept. 7, 2019). The statement (which was released too late to be addressed in this
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[their] customers,” “[i]nvesting in [their] employees,” “[d]ealing fairly and ethically with
[their] suppliers,” “[s]upporting the communities in which [they] work,” and “[g]enerating
long-term value for shareholders.” Id. The statement concluded by noting: “Each of our
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